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Monroe G. McKay and American Indian Law: In 
Honor of Judge McKay's Tenth Anniversary on 
the Federal Bench 
Erik M. Jensen* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In December 1987, Monroe G. McKay completed his first 
decade on the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Cir-
cuit. The McKay years have seen a revitalization of that court. 
From a staid, unimaginative body, the Tenth Circuit has become 
a vigorous center of intellectual activity,1 and its opinions are 
now read nationally with new respect. 
Judge McKay is not solely responsible for the enhanced rep-
utation of the court, but his role has been significant. Combining 
a scholar's interest in theory with an experienced litigator's abil-
ity2 to cut quickly to the heart of a complex legal problem, the 
* Associate Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University School of Law, 
Cleveland, Ohio. S.B., Massachusetts Institute of Technology (1967); M.A., University of 
Chicago (1972); J.D., Cornell Law School (1979). The author served as one of Judge Mc-
Kay's clerks in 1979-80, and he is willing to return for another go of it. 
The author wishes to express his appreciation to the library staff at the Case West-
ern Reserve University School of Law, particularly Patricia J. Harris and Mary Ledoux, 
who provided substantial assistance in the preparation of this article. 
1. Although the number of filed dissents is hardly a perfect measure of a court's 
intellectual vigor, it is a relevant statistic. In the 1976-77 term (July-June) of the Tenth 
Circuit, before Judge McKay joined the court, only 16 dissents were filed by all judges. 
In his first seven months on the bench (December 1977-June 1978), Judge McKay alone 
filed seven dissents, and he added 13 in the next 12-month period. He has had as many 
as 17 dissents in one term (1985-86). 
The average number of dissents filed during this ten-year period by other judges 
also has risen. For example, in 1985-86 a total of 20 non-McKay dissents came down. 
This increase in open doctrinal disputes appears not to have been accompanied by ran-
cor; the court remains, at least to outward appearances, an extraordinarily congenial 
body. 
2. Following a clerkship with the Honorable Jesse A. Udall of the Arizona Supreme 
Court in 1961, Judge McKay practiced with the renowned Phoenix, Arizona law firm of 
Lewis & Roca from 1961 to 1966 and from 1968 to 1974. During the intervening years, 
Judge McKay served as Peace Corps Director in Malawi. In 1974, he joined the faculty of 
the new J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, and remained there 
until 1977, when he was appointed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth 
Circuit. See Monroe G. McKay, in 2 ALMANAC OF THE FEDERAL JuDICIARY (1987). 
1103 
1104 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [1987 
Judge has been a leader on the court in many areas of the law 
and has become a jurist of national prominence. 
A tenth anniversary is a customary time for tributes and 
commentaries, and Judge McKay will not escape. Too many un-
abashed admirers, including this author, want to participate in 
the celebration. To honor the Judge, this article takes the form 
of a contribution to a Festschrift. 8 Rather than providing gush-
ing praise and little else,' it examines one of the areas of the law 
in which the Judge has been most prominent: American Indian 
law. By being occasionally critical-indeed, by questioning the 
philosophical foundation for Indian law and policy-'-the author 
in no way intends to diminish the Judge's accomplishments. 
This article's premise is the proposition that a scholar-teacher-
judge5 can receive no higher tribute than to have hiswork pub-
licly (and maybe painfully) dissected.6 
No forum could be more appropriate than this Law Review 
to honor Judge McKay.7 He was a full-time faculty member of 
the J, Reuben Clark Law School from 1974 until his appoint-
ment to the court by President Carter in 1977. Judge McKay 
has retained close contacts with the school, and he remains an 
ardent supporter. 
3. The author hopes the Festschrift-an essay in honor of, but not entirely about, 
Judge McKay-does not give the Judge short shrift. 
4. The author will be delighted to gush, but only in a less formal setting. 
5. That the Judge is seen as a scholar-teacher by those who appear before him can 
be discerned from the "Lawyers' Comments" collected in Monroe G. McKay, supra note 
2: 
Courteous, liberal, intelligent, professorial, attentive to both sides, works hard, 
write.s well .... "Professorial, scholarly, listens well, has the respect of the 
other judges." "Still a bit too much the teacher. Sometimes lectures lawyers." 
"Should not treat lawyers as students." "Very diligent, well prepared. His 
opinions are well reasoned." "Professorial, a good writer." 
The commentator intended "too much the teacher" to be critical, but it is in fact high 
praise. What more could anyone ask than to be called "professorial" not once, but sev-
eral times? 
6. If there can be a higher tribute, consider it given. A great judge's work stimulates 
thought, but Judge McKay of course cannot be held responsible for the strange direc-
tions that stimulated thought may take. 
7. In its brief history, this Law Review has published a number of significant contri-
butions to the Indian law literature. See, e.g., Grimsrud, Doing Business on an Indian 
Reservation: Can the Non-Indian Enforce His Contract with the Tribe?, 1981 B.Y.U. L. 
REv. 319; Ranquist, The Winters Doctrine and How It Grew: Federal Reservation of 
Rights to the Use of Water, 1975 B.Y.U. L. REv. 639; Comment, Federal Preemption of 
State .Authority to Tax Non-Indian Mineral Development on Indian Lands, 1982 
B.Y.U. L. REv. 919; Comment, Tribal Sovereignty and the Supreme Court's 1977-1978 
Term, 1978 B.Y.U. L. REV. 911. 
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Indian law-the jurisprudence "defining and implementing 
the relationship among the United States, Indian tribes and in-
dividuals, and the states"8-is a particularly appropriate subject 
for a tribute to Judge McKay.9 This is an area in which he has 
written a great deaP0 and about which he cares deeply. Although 
all McKay opinions reflect thoughtfulness and concern for craft, 
in this area they evidence refined, informed passion as well. 11 
The passion comes from the importance of the cases. If 
traditional legal scholars and the general populace have any view 
of Indian law, it is that the subject has an impact only at soci-
ety's periphery.12 Most Indian litigation directly affects a small 
percentage of the population, 13 and it is not glamorous: one sym-
8. FELIX S. CoHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 1 (R. Strickland ed. 1982) 
[hereinafter 1982 CoHEN HANDBOOK]. The term "Indian law" as commonly used does not 
include the study of tribal dispute resolution systems, except insofar as those systems 
affect the tribes' relationships with federal and state governments. The study of such 
systems has itself become an area of scholarly interest. See, e.g., E. HoEBEL, THE LAW OF 
PRIMITIVE MAN (1979); K. LLEWELLYN & E. HOEBEL, THE CHEYENNE WAY (1941); R. 
STRICKLAND, FIRE AND THE SPIRITS: CHEROKEE LAW FROM CLAN TO COURT (1975). Because 
of jurisdictional disputes, modern tribal court systems, which are in many .ways modelled 
after the United States court system, are often implicated in Indian law. See generally S. 
BRAKEL, AMERICAN INDIAN TRIBAL COURTS (1978) (recommending abolition of tribal court 
systems); V. DELORIA JR. & C. LYTLE, AMERICAN INDIANS, AMERICAN JUSTICE 110-38 (1983) 
(describing Indian courts); see also Taylor, Modern Practice in the Indian Courts, 10 U. 
PUGET SOUND L. REV. 231 (1987). 
9. In a ten-year span the Judge has authored opinions in so many areas that a com-
prehensive examination of his jurisprudence must await a fuller study, perhaps to com-
memorate the close of his second decade on the court. The Judge's work in conspiracy 
theory and double jeopardy doctrine should certainly be examined at length. The Judge 
has published a dissertation on the latter subject in a nonjudicial (but judicious) setting. 
See McKay, Double Jeopardy: Are the Pieces the Puzzle?, 23 WASHBURN L.J. 1 (1983); 
See also McKay, Book Review, 81 MicH. L. REv. 811 (1983) (reviewing book on judicial 
reform). 
10. See infra notes 145-49 for a list of the McKay Indian law opinions. Because of 
the tribal concentrations within its six-state area, the Tenth Circuit is rivaled only by 
the Ninth Circuit as an important Indian law jurisdiction. 
11. Cf. A. BLOoM, THE CLOSING OF THE AMERICAN MIND 71 (1987) ("Civilization or, 
to say the same thing, education is the taming or domestication of the soul's raw pas-
sions-not suppressing or excising them, which would deprive the soul of its energy-but 
forming and informing them as art."). 
12. In contrast, in the early days of the republic, relations with the Indian tribes 
indisputably constituted a central issue of public policy. The First Congress enacted four 
laws dealing with Indian affairs in its first five weeks of existence. See C. WILKINSON, 
AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME, AND THE LAW 13 (1987). 
13. "Indian affairs are only an eddy within national policy." Id. at 25 (footnote 
omitted). If the 1980 census figure of 1,418,195 American Indians is accurate, Indians 
comprise only about 5% of the total United States population. However, that percentage 
may be too high because it represents an implausible increase of almost 79% over the 
1970 census figure of 792,730. The census now relies on self-identification, and it may 
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pathetic Supreme Court justice publicly referred to Indian cases 
as "crud."14 But even if the stakes in some" cases seem trivial 
(something that could be said about any area of the law), 15 the 
body of Indian law has a higher meaning. This nation defines 
itself, at least in part, by its treatment of insular minorities.16 
currently be "profitable, fashionable, or simply self-fulfilling" to identify oneself as an 
Indian. D. GETCHES & C. WILKINSON, FEDERAL INDIAN LAw 6 (2d ed. 1986). 
Whatever number is accepted, it is, in absolute terms, small. However, Indians do 
comprise more than 5% of the population in a number of states-Hawaii (18.90%), 
Alaska (15.94%), New Mexico (8.04%), South Dakota (6.53%), Arizona (5.62%), and 
Oklahoma (5.60%). Id. at 7. 
Indian land comprises only 2.4% of all land in the United States, but concentrations 
are substantial in some western states: Arizona (26.99%), South Dakota (9.70%), New 
Mexico (8.80%). In addition, under the terms of the Alaska Native Claims Settlement 
Act, Alaska Natives (a category that includes Eskimos and Aleuts as well as Indians) will 
eventually own about 12% of Alaskan land, nearly doubling the percentage of United 
States land owned by tribes and Indian individuals. Id. at 13. 
Indian land is important to the general public because some of it has great potential 
for development. For example, 10% of the country's coal and oil resources and 1.5% 
percent of the nation's commercial timber are estimated to be on Indian lands. Wilkin-
son, Shall the Islands Be Preserved?, 16 AM. WEST, May-June 1979, at 32-34, quoted in 
Strickland, Genocide-at-Law: An Historic and Contemporary View of the Native Amer-
ican Experience, 34 U. KAN. L. REv. 713, 717-18 (1986). 
14. In discussing Supreme Court opinion-writing assignments, Justice Blackmun 
commented that 
[i]f one's in the doghouse with the Chief [Justice], he gets the crud .... He 
gets the tax cases, and some of the Indian cases, which I like but I've had a lot 
of them. 
You know, ... there are cases that are fun· to write. And there are cases 
that are not. 
Taylor, Reading the Tea Leaves of a New Term, N.Y. Times, Dec. 22, 1986, at B-14, col. 
3. Even without the glamour, and to the consternation of some justices (see, e.g., Wash-
ington v. Confederated Tribes, 447 U.S. 134, 176 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring and 
dissenting) ("well-defined body of principles is essential in order to end the need for 
case-by-case litigation which has plagued this area [scope of Indian immunity from state 
taxation]"), the Supreme Court has heard a substantial number of Indian law cases in 
recent years-more, for example, than it has heard in the securities and bankruptcy ar-
eas. The Court decided 12 Indian law cases in the 1960s, 35 in the 1970s, and, through 
the end of the 1985 term, 32 in the 1980s. C. WILKINSON, supra note 12, at 2, 123-32. In 
the 1986 term alone the Court decided cases dealing with riparian rights, United States 
v. Cherokee Nation, 107 S. Ct. 1487 (1987); state regulation of bingo games on an Indian 
reservation, California v. Cabazon Band, 107 S. Ct. 1083 (1987); exhaustion of tribal 
court remedies, Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 107 S. Ct. 971 (1987); the extent of the 
Interior Secretary's obligation to determine whether Alaskan oil leases would affect 
Alaska Natives' subsistence rights and culture, Amoco Prod. Co. v. Village of Gambell, 
107 S. Ct. 1396 (1987); and the Indian Land Consolidation Act of 1983, Hodel v. Irving, 
107 S. Ct. 2076 (1987). 
15. Judge McKay would not necessarily agree with this notion. 
16. Cf. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938) (sug-
gesting that a "more searching judicial inquiry" than presumption of constitutionality 
may be called for with respect to "prejudice against discrete and insular minorities"). 
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Indian relations are, it has been said, our national "morality 
play":17 "The 'Indian problem' ... challenges the most precious 
assumptions about what this country stands for_;,cultural plu-
ralism, equity and justice, the integrity of the individual, free-
dom of conscience and action, and the pursuit of happiness. "18 
Indian law affects us all, Indian and non-Indian alike.19 
This article begins, in part II, with a rumination on the dif-
ficulty of justifying a separatist policy for the American Indian. 
This part attempts to show that such a concern should underlie 
any evaluation of Indian law. The argument in part II is cer-
tainly not Judge McKay's, but he is responsible for sparking the 
author's interest.20 In part III, the article examines the McKay 
Indian law opinions, singling one out for special attention.21 Fi-
nally, part IV discusses the McKay opinions and the issue of 
separation. 22 
17. SPECIAL 8UBCOMM. ON INDIAN EDUCATION, SENATE COMM. ON LABOR AND PUBLIC 
WELFARE, INDIAN EDUCATION: A NATIONAL TRAGEDY-A NATIONAL CHALLENGE, S. REP. No. 
501, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1969). 
18. Id. 
19. The foremost scholar of Indian law, the philosopher Felix 8. Cohen, penned 
what is perhaps the most vivid statement of the Indian's importance: "Like the miner's 
canary, the Indian marks the shift from fresh air to poison gas in our political atmo-
sphere; and our treatment of Indians, even more than our treatment of other minorities, 
reflects the rise and fall in our democratic faith." Cohen, The Erosion of Indian Rights, 
1950-1953: A Case Study in Bureaucracy, 62 YALE L.J. 348, 390 (1953); see F. FRANK-
FURTER, Felix S. Cohen, in OF LAW AND LIFE &,OTHER THINGS THAT MATTER 143, 143 (P. 
Kurland ed. 1967) (Cohen was "unrivalled authority" within field of Indian law; his 
H~NDBOOK, see infra note 25, "was an acknowledged guide for the Supreme Court"); 
Felix S. Cohen, 9 RuTGERS L. REV. 345 (1954) (biography and bibliography of Cohen), 
reprinted in FELIX S. CoHEN's HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW VII (1971 ed. Univ. of 
New Mexico Press); Feldman, Felix S. Cohen and His Jurisprudence: Reflections on 
Federal Indian Law, 35 BuFFALO L. REv. 479 (1986) (discussing relationship between 
Cohen's writings in legal philosophy and his writings on Indian law); see also R. SuM-
MERS, INSTRUMENTALISM AND AMERICAN LEGAL THEORY (1982) (discussing America's dom-
inant philosophy of law, "pragmatic instrumentalism," of which Cohen was a sophisti-
cated adherent). 
20. See infra notes 23-144 and accompanying text. The exquisite pleasure of work-
ing for Judge McKay comes in part from his willingness to participate in wide-ranging, 
passionate discussions of fundamental issues, sometimes relating to pending cases, some-
times not. Disagreements are common, particularly if the Judge is surrounded by "Re-
publican clerks," as he occassionally is. However, the disagreements indicate no lack of 
admiration and respect on either side. To the contrary, the Judge welcomes, even de-
mands, disagreement. Both the intensity of the discussion and the later intra-office rec-
onciliation evidence profound mutual admiration and respect. See supra note 6. 
21. See infra notes 145-227 and accompanying text. 
22. See infra notes 228-30 and accompanying text. 
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II. INDIAN LAW AND SEPARATION 
The human beings who are scattered over this space [the 
American continent] do not form, as in Europe, so many 
branches of the same stock. Three races, naturally distinct, 
and, I might almost say, hostile to each other, are discovera-
ble among them at the first glance. Almost insurmountable 
barriers had been raised between them by education and law, 
as well as by their origin and outward characteristics; but for-
tune has brought them together on the' same soil, where, al-
though they are mixed, they do not amalgamate, and each 
race fulfills its destiny apart. [Alexis-Henri-Charles-Maurice 
Clerel, Comte de Tocqueville (1835)] 23 
"Indian law" exists because the American Indian is treated 
differently from other American citizens.2" One would rightly 
scoff at the notion of "Irish-American law" or "Italo-American 
law," but "American Indian law" has become a recognized legal 
subject. 211 The primary sources of Indian law are vast and often 
. 23. 1 A. DE TocQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 332 (P. Bradley ed. Alfred A. 
Knopf 1945). · 
24. All American Indians "born within the territorial limits of the United States" 
are citizens of the United States, regardless of their wishes, as a result of a 1924 statute. 
Citizenship Act of 1924, ch. 233, 43 Stat. 253 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1401(b) (1982)). 
Prior to that time, with some exceptions (see 1982 CoHEN HANDBOOK, supra note 8, at 
142-43), many Indians could become citizens only through naturalization, even if they 
had severed all ties with their tribes. The fourteenth amendment had provided in 1868 
that "[a}ll persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdic-
tion thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside." U.S. 
CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1.. The amendment made every black person born in the United 
States a citizen. Indians were not subject to United States jurisdiction, however, and 
therefore were not covered by the amendment. See W. BERNS, TAKING THE CoNSTITUTION 
SERIOUSLY 35-36 (1987). 
25. Felix S. Cohen, see supra note 19, can be said to have created the discipline of 
Indian law with the publication, under the auspices of the United States Department of 
the Interior, of his HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW in 1942. (The 1942 edition was 
reprinted in 1971 by the University of New Mexico Press [hereinafter 1942 CoHEN HAND-
BOOK}.) In 1958 the Interior Department, with a clear assimilationist goal in mind, un-
dertook a revision of the HANDBOOK. The revision, however, is generally discredited both 
as a reference volume and as a reflection of Cohen's work. The 1982 version of the HAND-
BOOK, supra note 8, is the handiwork of a distinguished group of scholars, headed by 
Rennard Strickland and Charles Wilkinson, who sought to update the original volume, 
making it once again a useful reference work, while retaining the spirit and wisdom of 
Felix Cohen. 
Indian law has become rec<Jgnized as a field of academic study. Two commercially 
published law school casebooks exist and both are in second editions. D. GETCHES & C. 
WILKINSON, supra note 13; M. PRICE & R. CLINTON, LAW AND THE AMERICAN INDIAN (2d 
ed. 1983) .. A study aid exists as well, prepared by a prominent scholar and jurist. W. 
CANBY, JR., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW IN A NUTSHELL (1981). 
1103] JUDGE MONROE G. McKAY 1109 
distinctive, including treaties,26 federal statutes,27 judicial deci-
sions,28 and the Constitution.29 Rather than being a subset of 
civil rights law,30 Indian law is sui generis. 81 
26. Until1871, the usual way for the federal government to deal with the tribes was 
by treaty (when the government was trying to be something other than merely oppres-
sive). Although not "foreign" states, the tribes were "nations" ("domestic dependent na-
tions"). Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831). Through a rider to the 
Indian Appropriations Act, ch. 120, 16 Stat. 544, 566 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 71 (1982)), 
the use of treaties ended, not so much because of any perceived diminution in the legal 
status of the tribes (although there had, of course, been a marked diminution in the 
quality of the tribes' existence), but because the House of Representatives insisted on 
participating in the formation of Indian policy. The treaty process, because it required 
the "advice and consent" of the Senate only, effectively excluded the House. See C. WIL-
KINSON, supra note 12, at 8, 138 n.3. 
27. These statutes have been enacted throughout United States' history. They re-
main on the books from periods when the governing federal policy was much different 
from what it is today, making the already difficult task of interpreting ancient statutes 
even more difficult. See generally C. WILKINSON, supra note 12 (effect of passage of time 
on interpretation). Many, but not all, of the provisions have been codified in Title 25 of 
the United States Code. 
28. There is an enormous body of judicial decisions starting with the Marshall 
Court. The Marshall "trilogy" of Indian law cases remains significant authority. See 
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 561 (1832) (tribes possess inherent sover-
eignty; "Cherokee Nation ... is a distinct community, occupying its own territory, with 
boundaries accurately described, in which the laws of Georgia can have no force"); Cher-
okee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831) (although tribes ar.e "nations," 
tribes have status "resembl[ing] that of a ward to his guardian," not a "foreign" state; 
tribe therefore could not bring original action in Supreme Court); Johnson v. Mcintosh, 
21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823) (Indians hold right of occupancy to ancestral lands but 
subject to defeasance by federal government; federal approval therefore required to 
alienate Indian title of aboriginal lands). 
Since 1970, Worcester, the foundation for the development of jurisdictional law in 
this area, has been cited by state and federal• courts more than all but three other pre-
Civil War opinions. C. WILKINSON, supra note 12, at 158 n.126. 
29. See infra note 93 and accompanying text. 
30. To prevent invidious discrimination, any statute directed at Indians as a racially 
defined class should be subject to the same strict scrutiny that applies to a law directed 
at any other minority group. See United States v. Antelope, 523 F.2d 400, 403-06 (9th 
Cir. 1975) (strict scrutiny is appropriate when statute disadvantages Indians based on 
their race), rev'd on other grounds, 430 U.S. 641, 645 (1977) (Major Crimes Act, 18 
U.S.C. § 1153 (1982), was "not based upon impermissible racial classifications"); Wash-
ington v. Confederated Bands & Tribes, 439 U.S. 463, 500-01 (1979) (while federal gov-
ernment may single out tribal Indians for special legislation, "[s]tates do not enjoy this 
same unique relationship with Indians"); 1982 CoHEN HANDBOOK, supra note 8, at 300-
04; L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1017-18 (1978); see also Craig v. Boren, 429 
U.S. 190, 209 n.22 (1976) (dictum: "unfairness and questionable constitutionality of sin-
gling out groups [including Indians] to bear the brunt of alcohol regulation"). But see 
Newton, Federal Power Over Indians: Its Sources, Scope, and Limitations, 132 U. PA. L. 
REv. 195, 282-84 (1984) (cases generally do not treat Indian classification as based on 
race). 
Although this country has established an extensive network of civil rights laws to 
protect racial minorities in general, those statutes have special application to Indians 
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The distinctive status of the Indian, 82 in American law and 
life, is reflected in the now dominant federal policy of separa-
tion. Separatist and assimilationist philosophies have vied for 
dominance over the years, with each enjoying several periods of 
ascendancy.88 Mter successful tribal resistance to the last push 
for assimilation during the early Eisenhower years, the dominant 
governing policy is now one of separation:84 the ideal is distinct 
and Indian tribes. For example, the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, which 
generally prohibits discrimination in employment, expressly provides that Indian tribes 
are not "employers" covered by the Act. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b)(l) (1982). Hence, a tribe 
may discriminate in favor of its members. See, e.g., Wardle v. Ute Indian Tribe, 623 F.2d 
670 (lOth Cir. 1980) (McKay, J.) (tribe entitled to fire non-member chief of police, with 
17 years of exemplary experience, to fill position with tribal member); cf. Morton v. 
Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 553 n.24 (1974) (upholding Bureau of Indian Affairs employment 
preference for qualified Indians from federally recognized tribe; since other Indians not 
entitled to preference, policy is not racial discrimination and a fortiori not invidious 
racial discrimination). 
31. See Newton, supra note 30, at 196-98; Washburn, The Historical Context of 
American Indian Legal Problems, in AMERICAN INDIANS AND THE LAW 12, 12 (L. Rosen 
ed. 1976). 
32. This article often refers to American Indians as if they constituted a single, ho-
mogeneous ethnic group. While that proposition will serve for present purposes, it is a 
gross simplification and for many purposes a falsification. See Strickland, supra note 13, 
at 736 ("We must learn what the friends of the Indian never learned, that there is no 
single Indian culture, that no one policy is capable of working effectively for all Indian 
people."). 
33. "Inevitably, Indian policy has been cyclic .... [F]ederal Indian policy has al-
ways been the product of the tension between two conflicting forces-separatism and 
assimilation-and Congress has never made a final· choice as to which of the two it will 
pursue." C. WILKINSON, supra note 12, at 13. 
34. The history is reviewed in many general sources, e.g., A. JosEPHY, JR., THE IN-
DIAN HERITAGE OF AMERICA 348-56 (1966); M. PRICE & R. CLINTON, supra note 25, at 68-
90, as well as in the monumental studies, e.g., F. PRUCHA, THE GREAT FATHER: THE 
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AND THE AMERICAN INDIANS (1984). Federal Indian policy is 
usually divided into several discrete historical periods, including the following: 
1. Reservation policy (until about 1887). Reservations were created in the mid-nine-
teenth century to keep newly defeated tribes separate from the white man. Reserva-
tions were often not on the tribes' traditional lands, and, without traditional sources 
of sustenance, reservation life could be particularly squalid. SeeS. TYLER, A HISTORY 
OF INDIAN POLICY 71-94 (1973). 
2. Allotment period (1887-1934). The General Allotment Act of 1887 (the "Dawes 
Act"), ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 331-334, 339, 341-
42, 348-49, 354, 381 (1982)), was, in general, intended to parcel out reservation lands 
to individual Indians, who, it was hoped, would become industrious farmers and 
gradually become assimilated into the United States population. Although enacted 
in a good faith attempt to help the Indian, the primary effect of the Act was to 
speed the transfer of land out of Indian hands. (In 1887 about 138 million acres were 
held by Indians; by 1932 about 90 million of those acres had passed to whites.) A. 
JoSEPHY, supra, at 350-51; see generally F. HoxiE, A FINAL PROMISE: THE CAMPAIGN 
TO AsSIMILATE THE INDIANS, 1880-1920 (1984) .. 
3. Emphasis on tribal self-government (1934-1953). The conditions under which the 
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tribal governments exercising dominion (subject to ultimate fed-
eral control) over distinct tribal lands. 
Today there is little serious discussion of any ·alternative to 
separation, 35 but it should be apparent how peculiar that policy 
Indian population lived in the 1920s were a national disgrace, as the Meriam Report 
chronicled. INSTITUTE FOR GOVERNMENT RESEARCH, THE PROBLEM OF INDIAN ADMINIS-
TRATION (1928). One response to the Report, the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 
ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-79 (1982)), slowed the 
assimilationist trend of Indian policy, ending the division of land by allotment and 
encouraging the creation of tribal governments with substantial power. The terms 
and conditions of self-government are generally subject to federal veto, however. See 
S. TYLER, supra, at 125-50. 
4. Termination (1953-1958). In 1953, assimilation once again became the official pol-
icy. For example, "Public Law 280" authorized state governments, if they so elected, 
to exert authority, without tribal approval, over criminal and civil matters on speci-
fied portions of Indian country. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, ch. 505, 67 Stat. 588. See 
Goldberg, Public Law 280: The Limits of State Jurisdiction Over Reservation Indi-
ans, 22 UCLA L. REv. 535 (1975). Moreover, a resolution declared Congress' intent 
to "terminate" relations with the tribes as quickly as possible. H.R. Con. Res. 108, 
67 Stat. B132 (1953). Under this policy, a number of tribes, including the Me-
nominees (see Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 404 (1968) (discussing 
effect of termination on treaty hunting and fishing rights)), ended their status as 
self-governing bodies, in some cases with disastrous economic results. See S. TYLER, 
supra, at 180-81. 
5. Return to separation and self-determination (1958 to present). In the latter part 
of the Eisenhower administration, the prevailing assimilationist view· changed (see 
id. at 179-80 (1958 speech by Interior Secretary Seaton)), although termination was 
not officially repudiated until the Nixon years. See Indian Self-Determination Act 
and Education Assistance Act, Pub. L. No. 93-638, 88 Stat. 2203 (1975) (codified at 
· 25 U.S.C. §§ 450-450n (1982)) (allowing federal government to contract with tribal 
governments to operate programs previously administered by federal departments); 
President's Message to Congress Transmitting Recommendations for Indian Policy, 
H.R. Doc. No. 363, 91st Cong., 2d Seas. 1 (1970), reprinted in PuB. PAPERS: RICHARD 
NixoN 564, 565 (1970) ("The time has come to break decisively with the past and to 
create the conditions for a new era in which the Indian future is determined by 
Indian acts and Indian decisions.") [hereinafter "1970 Nixon Message," with cita-
tions to PuB. PAPERs}; Handrick, A Chippewa Case: Resource Control and Self-De-
termination, 11 CULTURAL SURVIVAL Q. No. 2, at 39 (1987); see also W. BROPHY & S. 
ABERLE, THE INDIAN: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED BUSINESS (1966) (Report of the Commis-
sion on the Rights, Liberties and Responsibilities of the American Indian, funded by 
The Fund for the Republic, urging reemphasis of tribal values, but with ultimate 
assimilationist goal). 
35. Legislation is occasionally introduced that would return Indian policy to an 
avowed assimilationist goal, but in recent years none has survived the initial stages of the 
legislative process. See R. BARSH & J. HENDERSON, THE ROAD: INDIAN TRIBES AND POLITI-
CAL LIBERTY 291 (1980). 
If there is discussion in the literature about alternatives to separation, it is about 
extending the policy, by removing or further limiting federal power over the Indian. E.g., 
id.'at 279-82 (urging constitutional amendment to realize "treaty federalism," with tribes 
generally having powers of states (if they wish), but able to define their own member-
ship); D. McNICKLE, THEY CAME HERE FIRST 285 (rev. ed. 1975) ("Return the right of 
decision to the tribes-restore their power to hold the dominant society at arm's 
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is. Heightened interest in the Indian "problem" was attributable 
in part to the black civil rights protests of the late 1950s and 
1960s and the resulting general recognition and celebration of 
ethnic diversity in this country. 36 Certainly the "rise in temper" 
of the Indian protest was fueled by the civil rights movement. 37 
However, the mainstream civil rights movement has been, if not 
amalgamationist in emphasis, decidedly integrationist.38 The In-
dian movement has taken an entirely different path. 
A fundamental issue of American political philosophy there-
fore underlies Indian jurisprudence: Should the principles gov-
erning the rest of a pluralist society be inapplicable to the In-
dian? In particular, should a society that has committed itself to 
the idea, an idea with constitutional underpinnings, that "sepa-
rate is not equal"39 countenance a policy of de jure separation 
with respect to the Indian? Americans no longer view as inevita-
length"); Rotenberg, American Indian Tribal Death-A Centennial Remembrance, 41 
U. MIAMI L. REv. 409, 409 (1986) (lamenting centennial of United States v. Kagama, 118 
U.S. 375 (1886), which held "that Indian tribes could no longer resist congressional laws 
simply by rejecting them," and urging rectification). Justification for further separation 
has been found in the right to self-determination recognized under international law. See 
Barsh, Indigenous North America and Contemporary International Law, 62 OR. L. REv. 
73 (1983); Comment, Toward Consent and Cooperation: Reconsidering the Political 
Status of Indian Nations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 507, 586-602 (1987). 
36. The end of the belief in the "melting pot" as the metaphor for American society 
coincided with social scientists' recognition that ethnicity makes a political difference 
(something the man on the street, and the ward committeeman, had always known). See 
generally AMERICAN ETHNIC POLITICS (L. Fuchs ed. 1968); ETHNIC GROUP POLITICS (H. 
Bailey, Jr. & E. Katz eds. 1969); N. GLAZER & D. MoYNIHAN, BEYOND THE MELTING PoT 
(2d ed. 1970); M. GoRDON, AssiMILATION IN AMERICAN LIFE (1964); THE ETHNIC FACTOR IN 
AMERICAN PoLITICS (B. Hawkins & R. Lorinskas eds. 1970). 
37. D. McNICKLE, supra note 35, at 274. Concern for ethnic diversity and aboriginal 
rights is, however, not peculiar to the United States. See, e.g., M. AscH, HoME AND NA-
TIVE LAND: ABORIGINAL RIGHTS AND THE CANADIAN CONSTITUTION (1984); THE QUEST FOR 
JusTICE: ABoRIGINAL PEOPLES AND ABORIGINAL RIGHTS (M. Boldt & J. Long eds. 1985). 
For an extraordinary judicial discussion of aboriginal rights, in a 154-page opinion that 
draws on the learning and decisions of many countries, see Milirrpum v. Nabalco Pty. 
Ltd., 17 F.L.R. 141 (Sup. Ct. N. Terr. of Austr. 1971) (aborigines unsuccessfully claimed 
that ancestral rights in land had been unlawfully invaded by Australia's grant of leases 
to mining company). 
38. See Storing, Introduction, in WHAT CouNTRY HAVE I?: PoLITICAL WRITINGS BY 
BLACK AMERICANS 1, 4-5 (H. Storing ed. 1970). 
39. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) ("[I]n the field of public 
education the doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no place. Separate educational facili-
ties are inherently unequal."). Such a concern is not knee-jerk liberalism, although it has 
been implicitly characterized as such. See R. BARSH & J. HENDERSON, supra note 35, at 
241: "In the generation following Brown[,] ... political liberals and a liberal judiciary 
have labored for racial assimilation. Advocacy of racial equality has become synonymous 
with, and essential to, liberal political identity. In this context reservations are immedi-
ately assumed to be pernicious outposts of ghettoization." 
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ble Tocqueville's division of the North American population into 
hostile races, with distinct destinies-or do they? 
This article briefly grapples with the issue of separation, 
contrasting the political-legal status of Indians and blacks at 
both the nation's founding and today. As discussed in section A, 
under the traditional view, the view of the founders,40 there was 
a sufficient similarity between blacks and Indians that one might 
have predicted similar futures for the two groups. Today, how-
ever, their statuses are radically different. The uneasy justifica-
tions offered for maintaining this difference are examined in sec-
tion B. 
A. The Nation's Founding and Equality: The Original Case 
for Separation 
The American tradition has been assimilationist in the 
sense that, to be Americanized-and, in principle, anyone could 
be Americanized-a person needed only to accept and recognize 
the natural rights of man,41 the rights with which men were "en-
dowed by their Creator."42 By doing so, Allan Bloom has argued, 
men found a fundamental basis of unity and sameness. Class, 
race, religion, national origin or culture all disappear or become 
dim when bathed in the light of natural rights, which give men 
common interests and make them truly brothers. The immi-
40. The word "founders" refers to those men who were present at the constitutional 
convention in 1787 and to other prominent statesmen of the time, such as Thomas Jef-
ferson. The positions attributed to the founders will, in general, be accurate. However, 
no founder would necessarily have agreed with all of the propositions, and some would 
have strongly disagreed with certain statements. 
41. To be "Americanized" thus meant something: to pledge allegiance to "Ameri-
canism," an idea that has no counterpart in other western societies. See W. BERNS, supra 
note 24, at 21-22; see also A. MANN, THE ONE AND THE MANY: REFLECTIONS ON THE AMERI· 
CAN IDENTITY 177, 179 (1979) (candidate for naturalization becomes citizen of United 
States by "identifying with the Constitutional principles of the Republic"; "[flew other 
multiethnic countries live by a transcending creed that the members of their constituent 
tribes or nationalities have willingly chosen."). This view of America's uniqueness is not 
simple jingoism, although many will take it as such. "Americanism" exists-as "French-
ism," for example, does not-in that this nation "was deliberately brought into being at 
a particular moment of time and for a specific purpose." W. BERNS, supra note 24, at 22. 
42. Once known to every American schoolchild, the full passage from the Declara-
tion of Independence reads: 
We hold these truths to be self evident, that all men are created equal, 
that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that 
among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. That to secure 
these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just pow-
ers from the consent of the governed . . . . 
The Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776). 
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grant had to put behind him the claims of the Old World in 
favor of a new and easily acquired education. This did not nec-
essarily mean abandoning old daily habits or religions, but it 
did mean subordinating them to new principles:u 
The polity could be, necessarily would be, pluralist-with a vari-
ety of interests, even factions-but with a common philosophical 
core. The population would be united by something more than 
the historical accident that found diverse peoples within a com-
mon geographical boundary. 
At the time of the founding, despite the eloquent language 
of the Declaration of Independence,44 the American population 
was not united. In particular, blacks and Indians were not enti-
tled to be Americanized.411 Even if blacks had not been enslaved, 
it is unlikely that the white population would have accepted 
them as potentially full participants in the body politic. They 
were seen as too different, decidedly inferior in important 
abilities.46 
Indians, in contrast, generally had not been enslaved. 47 
Many founders saw the Indian as a degraded form of the white 
man, and therefore possibly assimilable in a way that blacks 
were not.48 Nevertheless, Indians, like blacks, were denied par-
ticipation in the American republic. That "Indians were fit to be 
citizens" probably did not even occur to the founders49 because 
Indians were thought to be barbarous, having no experience with 
law (as distinguished from force) or government.50 Accordingly, 
43. A. BLOOM, supra note 11, at 27; see A. MANN, supra note 41, at 178. A proper 
government would secure these rights: 
A person had only to be willing to give up his natural freedom-or his natural 
right to govern himself-and to assume the obligations attendant upon his new 
condition as a member of the "social state" formed by the compact. Any ra-
tional person could do that and could appreciate the advantages of doing that: 
only in this way could his rights be secured in fact. 
W. BERNS, supra note 24, at 30·31. 
44. See supra note 42. 
45. Other persons who were entitled to be Americanized, the Tories, decided against 
it. See W. BERNS, supra note 24, at 32-34. 
46. See infra notes 52, 71-72 and accompanying text. 
47. See infra notes 87-91 and accompanying text. 
48. See W. JoRDAN, WHITE OVER BLACK 477-81 (1968) (comparing Jefferson's views 
of blacks and Indians). 
49. W. BERNS, supra note 24, at 38. 
50. !d. While enslaved blacks were also seen as deficient in the capacity to partici-
pate in American government, western law and government were not entirely foreign to 
them. Through their close (albeit involuntary) relationship to whites, they saw the law in 
action; and, while generally denied civil rights, they were subject to the criminal laws and 
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until Indians developed the necessary faculties, and subdued 
their uninformed passions-if that was possible-prudence dic-
tated that Indians should not be part of the American people. 5 1 
Does the divergence between the Declaration's principle of 
equality and the practice of the founders demonstrate simple 
hypocrisy? Certainly reading the founders' descriptions of Indi-
ans and blacks can be painful; the descriptions of perceived in-
tellectual deficiencies, for example, are particularly harsh to 
modern ears.62 Moreover, as one evaluates the writings of the 
founders, it is difficult to put aside the subsequent, often cata-
strophic history of black-white and Indian-white relations in this 
country. Nevertheless, although the modern tendency is to casti-
gate the founders for their prejudices or, equally damning, to 
suggest that they were merely the products of their time,63 the 
founders' prejudices were surprisingly limited. 
Most of the founders saw no difference whatsoever among 
whites, blacks, and Indians in one critical respect. Although In-
were, in some cases, entitled to the protection of those laws. See Storing, Slavery and 
the Moral Foundations of the American Republic, in THE MoRAL FouNDATIONS OF THE 
AMERICAN REPUBLIC 313, 316 (R. Horwitz 3d ed. 1986). 
51. W. BERNS, supra note 24, at 38-39. 
52. E.g., T. JEFFERSON, NoTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA, query xiv, reprinted in 
THE LIFE AND SELECTED WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 256-62 (A. Koch & W. Peden 
eds. 1944) [hereinafter SELECTED WRITINGS]. Jefferson, as a good scientist, described the 
state of Indians and blacks as he saw it. Measured in terms of western European culture 
and values, both groups were found to be wanting, although the Indian was seen as hav-
ing more potential to achieve parity with the white man. See W. JoRDAN, supra note 48, 
at 477-81. 
Jefferson was nevertheless not a simple racist. As a good scientist, he also realized 
the limitations of his observations: the apparent inferior status of other peoples was not 
inevitable. T. JEFFERS,ON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA, queries vi, xiv, reprinted in 
SELECTED WRITINGS, supra, at 212 ("Before we condemn the Indians of this continent as 
wanting genius, we must consider that letters have not yet been introduced among 
them."), 260-61 ("Whether further observation will or will not verify the conjecture, that 
nature has been less bountiful to [blacks] in the endowments of the head, I believe that 
in those of the heart she will be found to have done them justice."); Letter from Thomas 
Jefferson to Benjamin Banneker (Aug. 30, 1791), reprinted in SELECTED WRITINGS, 
supra, at 508 ("Nobody wishes more than I do to see such proofs . . . that nature has 
given to our black brethren, talents equal to those of the other colors of men, and that 
the appearance of a want of them is owing merely to the degraded condition of their 
existence."); Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Henri Gregoire (Feb. 25, 1809), reprinted 
in SELECTED WRITINGS, supra, at 594 (to same effect). 
53. But see Storing, supra note 50, at 330 (emphasis in original): 
Prejudice-arbitrary liking and trust and, . of course, also disliking and mis-
trust---is inherent in political life, and its role is greater as the polity is more 
democratic. To criticize a Jefferson or a Lincoln for yielding to, even sharing 
in, white prejudice is equivalent to demanding either that he get out of politics 
altogether-and leave it to the merely prejudiced-or that he become a despot. 
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dians were thought unfit for United States citizenship, they were 
understood to have the rights of men, 54 just as enslaved blacks 
were understood by the founding generation (always with excep-
tions, of course) as having the rights of men.55 The three races 
had many differences, but no man,56 whatever his color, was 
thought to be without natural rights. 
The hard case, the case that may appear inconsistent with 
the proposition that the founders accepted equality of rights, 
was black slavery. In fact, however, there was no inconsistency. 
Even most of those founders who had slaves believed slavery to 
be unjust, an abomination, contrary to nature and therefore con-
trary to natural right.117 In the Constitution, the founders com-
promised on the issue of slavery,58 but not because of any belief 
54. See, e.g., Jefferson, Second Inaugural Address (March 4, 1805), reprinted in SE-
LECTED WRITINGS, supra note 52, at 339, 341 ("aboriginal inhabitants" of land included 
in the Louisiana Purchase were "[e]ndowed'with the faculties and the rights of men"). 
55. See Storing, supra note 50, at 316; see also Letter from Thomas Jefferson to 
Henri Gregoire (Feb. 25, 1809), reprinted in SELECTED WRITINGS, supra note 52, at 594, 
595 ("Whatever be their degree of talent it is no measure of their rights. Because Sir 
Isaac Newton was superior to others in understanding, he was not therefore lord of the 
person or property of others."). 
56. In this article the terms "man" and "men" (and their associated pronouns) 
should be understood to include both men and women. 
57. The founders could, consistent with natural right, refuse to live together in the 
same nation with blacks. "What they did not have a right to do, however, was to exclude 
the blacks from their society-along with the Indians and the Tories-while continuing 
to govern them. This was a violation of natural right, and, what is more, they knew it. 
Indeed, they acknowledged it." W. BERNS, supra note 24, at 41. For example, Patrick 
Henry asked rhetorically, "Is it not amazing that at a time, when the Rights of Human-
ity are defined & understood with precision, in a Country above all others fond of Lib-
erty, that in such an Age, & such a Country we find Men . . . adopting a Principle as 
repugnant to humanity." Letter from Patrick Henry to Robert Pleasants (Jan. 18, 1773), 
reprinted in W. BERNS, supra note 24, at 41. 
Slavery was to Jefferson a "great political and moral evil," T. JEFFERSON, NoTEs ON 
THE STATE OF VIRGINIA, query viii, reprinted in SELECTED WRITINGS, supra note 52, at 
219, with debilitating effects on both master and slave. "I tremble for my country when I 
reflect that God is just; that his justice cannot sleep forever .... The Almighty has no 
attribute which can take side with us in such a contest [between masters and slaves]." T. 
JEFFERSON, NoTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA, query xviii, reprinted in SELECTED WRIT-
INGS, supra note 52, at 279. See G. WILLS, INVENTING AMERICA: JEFFERSON's DECLARATION 
OF INDEPENDENCE 228, 306 (1978). 
58. Slavery was not eradicated, but the term "slavery" or "slave" is not used in the 
Constitution, and all of the constitutional provisions relating to slaves refer to them as 
"persons." U.S. CaNST. art I, § 2, cl. 3 ("Three fifths of all other Persons" counted for 
purposes of apportionment); art. I, § 9, cl. 1 (postponement of power to prohibit "Migra-
tion or Importation of such Persons"); art. IV, § 2, cl. 3 (relating to "Person(s] held to 
Service or Labour in one state" who are fugitives in other states). Neither was slavery 
intended to be propped up. Each of the three constitutional provisions, while certainly 
compromises with evil, represents a narrow accommodation when compared to alterna-
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in its rightness or .inevitability. Rather, the founders agreed that 
the formation of the union was necessary and that there would 
be no union without some temporary accommodation with slav-
ery. Furthermore, it was not clear how slavery could be simply 
and immediately abolished.119 , 
The founders were not immune from hypocrisy, of course, 
and grand prose may in some cases have hidden purely selfish 
motives. Viewed in the abstract, without regard to the felt neces-
sities of the time, professing antislavery sentiments while main-
taining slaves, as many did, appears to be the height of hypoc-
risy. But political life is not lived in the abstract. If they were to 
be statesmen, 60 the founders, including those without slaves, 
could not simply ignore factors they deemed unpleasant, such as 
fears about the aftermath of immediate abolition. They could at 
best hope to establish the antislavery principle, which they did, 
while providing minimal support to the abhorrent practice. No 
one could reasonably have thought, if the constitutional conven-
tion were to collapse over the issue, that slavery would be 
brought to its knees. 
Perhaps the compromises made with slavery were too gener-
ous-hindsight suggests that slavery may have received more 
support than was intended-but they were not made without a 
great deal of 'thought and soul-searching. The view that the 
founders considered blacks and Indians to be nonpersons with-
out the rights of men-a view that has been given legitimacy by 
tive possibilities. See Storing, supra note 50, at 320-24 (discussing constitutional treat-
ment of slavery). 
59. Blacks constituted a large percentage of the population in the southern states. 
See A MANN, supra note 41, at 86 (all but 50,000 of the 500,000 bound blacks in the 
United States in 1776 were in the South, and blacks constituted at least half of the 
population in many southern states). Physical safety of whites was therefore a concern. 
As Jefferson saw it, "[W]e have the wolf by the ears, and we can neither hold him, nor 
safely let him go. Justice is in one scale, and self-preservation in the other." Letter from 
Thomas Jefferson to John Holmes (Apr. 22, 1820) reprinted in SELECTED WRITINGS, 
supra note 52, at 698. Moreover, blacks were in fact living in adegraded condition, un-
prepared, it was thought, to suddenly fend for themselves. See Roche, Equality in 
America, in AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT 140, 146 (J. Roche ed. 1967) (emphasis in 
original) ("Any individual or group which urged emancipation had perforce to come to 
terms with the Negro .... What becomes of the Negroes after they have been released 
from slavery?"). Certainly individual manumission, if encouraged, would have led to sig-
nificant suffering; the aged and infirm would have been the first to be freed. See G. 
WILLS, supra note 57, at 296-97. 
60. Professor Jaffa described "the task of statesmanship": "to know what is good or 
right, to know how much of that good is attainable, and to act to secure that much good 
but not to abandon the attainable good by grasping for more." H. JAFFA, CRISIS OF THE 
HousE DIVIDED 371 (Washington paperbacks ed. 1973). 
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recent well-reported speeches of prominent jurists,61 including 
Supreme Court Justice Thurgood Marshall62-is contrary to 
substantial evidence. This view fails to account for the anguish 
in many of the founders' writings and speeches68 and, more im-
portant, it fails to account for the language of the Declaration 
and the Constitution. 64 Essentially, this revisionist history is 
fundamentally, dreadfully wrong.65 Justice Marshall's reading 
61. See Martin, Blacks and Constitution are the Focus of a Panel, N.Y. Times, 
May 31, 1987, § 1, at 44, col. 1 (quoting Third Circuit Judge A. Leon Higginbotham: 
"Under the original Constitution, blacks were not people."). 
62. In a speech on May 6, 1987, Justice Marshall challenged the bicentennial cele-
bration of the Constitution, characterizing the constitutional scheme as "defective from 
the start." Kamen, Marshall Blasts Celebration of Constitution Bicentennial: Justice 
Calls Document 'Defective From Start', Wash. Post, May 7, 1987, at 1, col. 1; Savage, 
Marshall on Constitution: 'Defective from Start', L. A. Times, May 7, 1987, pt. I, at 4, 
col. 1. It took the Civil War and the fourteenth amendment to, in effect, replace the 
Constitution: "While the Union survived the Civil War, the Constitution did not." Mar-
shall, Reflections. on the Bicentennial of the United States Constitution, 101 HARV. L. 
REv. 1, 4 (1987) (reprint of speech) [hereinafter "Marshall Speech"]. Moreover, Marshall 
did not "find the wisdom, foresight and sense of justice exhibited by the framers particu-
larly profound." Id. at 2. Although some objections to slavery were raised, the founders 
"eventually consented to a document which laid a foundation for the tragic events that 
were to follow." Id. at 3. 
63. Professed anguish may be part of rationalization, but rationalizations are rea-
sons that can be evaluated on their own terms. Why should the founders have bothered 
with mere rationalization if they were comfortable with the idea of slavery? Justice 
Thurgood Marshall noted that the "use of the words 'slaves' and 'slavery' was carefully 
avoided in the original document [the Constitution]." Marshall Speech, supra note 62 at 
2; see supra note 58. Why did the founders bother to be so careful? 
Anguish was not limited to the founding period. In the antebellum South, "nothing 
was more common than Southern judges giving public utterance to the excruciating ag-
ony of trying to reconcile the law that protected slavery with the principle of justice that 
condemns it." Storing, supra note 50, at 317 (discussing State v. Mann, 13 N.C. (2 Dev.) 
263, 266 (1829), which held that a master cannot commit illegal battery on a slave since 
the slave has no appeal from the master, but the judge added, "I most freely confess my 
sense of the harshness of this proposition, I feel it as deeply as any man can. And as a 
principle of moral right, every person in his retirement must repudiate it."). 
64. See supra notes 42, 58. Justice Marshall went so far as to say that the constitu-
tional compromise with slavery was adopted "with no explanation of the conflicting prin-
ciples for which the American Revolutionary War had ostensibly been fought," the "self 
evident" truths of the Declaration. Marshall Speech, supra note 62, at 2. In fact, the 
critical explanation was that the union had to be formed. See supra notes 58-59 and 
accompanying text. If Justice Marshall meant that the founders did not prepare lengthy 
treatises reconciling the principles of slavery with the principles of the Revolution, he 
was correct: the founders unde:r:stood that slavery was fundamentally wrong. 
65. It is dreadfully wrong in that a system of laws, including the Constitution, needs 
veneration, even unthinking veneration, if it is to have any moral effect. See A. LINCOLN, 
The Perpetuation of Our Political Institutions, in 1 THE COLLECTED WoRKS OF ABRAHAM 
LINCOLN 108 (R. Basler ed. 1953) [hereinafter CoLLECTED WoRKS] (urging that "rever-
ence for the Constitution and laws" become America's "political religion"); see also H. 
JAFFA, supra note 60, at 227-32 (analyzing Lincoln's "Perpetuation" speech}. Unfounded, 
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implies that Chief Justice Taney's opinion in Dred Scott v. 
Sandford,66 the most disastrous judicial opinion in American 
history, was correct.67 Abraham Lincoln68 and Frederick 
Douglass69 knew better. 
but superficially plausible, denigration destroys that veneration. 
66. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). 
67. Justice Marshall found support for Taney's conclusion in the debates of the con-
stitutional convention, citing language from the Taney opinion that "reaffirmed the pre-
vailing opinion of the framers": "[Blacks] had for more than a century before been re-
garded as beings ... so far inferior, that they had no rights which the white man was 
bound to respect." Marshall Speech, supra note 62, at 4 (quoting 60 U.S. at 407). But see 
Storing, supra note 50, at 313-14; supra notes 53-59 and accompanying text; infra notes 
68-69. As horrible as Taney's opinion was, Justice Marshall managed to do even it an 
injustice. He referred to the opinion as evidence of the founders' deficient views about 
several groups of people, including women. Taney, however, specifically considered the 
status of white women, who, even though not entitled to vote, were citizens, therefore not 
at all like the black man. 60 U.S. at 422. Taney also discussed Indians, who were poten-
tially entitled to all the rights of citizenship through naturalization, id. at 403-04, even 
though "Indian Governments were regarded ... as foreign Governments, as much so as 
if an ocean had separated the red man from the white." Id. at 404. 
68. For example, consider Lincoln's argument from his debate with Stephen A. 
Douglas at Alton, Illinois in 1858: 
At Galesburg the other day, I said in answer to Judge Douglas, that three years 
ago there never had been a man, so far as I knew or believed, in the whole 
world, who had said that the Declaration of Independence did not include ne-
groes in the term "all men." I re-assert it to-day. I assert that Judge Douglas 
and all his friends may search the whole records of the country, and it will be a 
matter of great astonishment to me if they shall be able to find that one 
human being three years ago had ever uttered the astounding sentiment that 
the term "all men" in the Declaration did not include the negro. Do not let me 
be misunderstood. I know that more than three years ago there were men who, 
finding this assertion constantly in the way of their schemes to bring about the 
ascendancy and perpetuation of slavery, denied the truth of it. I know that 
Mr. Calhoun and all the politicians of his school denied the truth of the Decla-
ration. I know that it ran along in the mouths of some Southern men for a 
period of years ... that the Declaration of Independence was in that respect 
"a self-evident lie," rather than a self-evident truth. But I say ... that three 
years ago there never had lived a man who had ventured to assail it in the 
sneaking way of pretending to believe it and then asserting it did not include 
the negro. I believe the first man who ever said it was Chief Justice Taney in 
the Dred Scott case, and the next to him was our friend Stephen A. Douglas. 
3 CoLLECTED WoRKS, supra note 65, at 301-02, reprinted in H. JAFFA, supra note 60, at 
313-14 (emphasis in original). 
69. I hold that the Federal Government was never, in its essence, anything but 
an anti-slavery government. Abolish slavery tomorrow, and not a sentence or 
syllable of the Constitution need be altered. It was purposely so framed as to 
give no claim, no sanction to the claim, of property in man. If in its origin 
slavery had any relation to the government, it was only as the scaffolding to 
the magnificent structure, to be removed as soon as the building was 
completed. 
F. DouGLASS, Address for the Promotion of Colored Enlistments, in 3 THE LIFE AND 
WRITINGS OF FREDERICK DOUGLASS 361, 365 (P. Foner ed. 1952), reprinted in Storing, 
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A belief in equality of political rights does not necessarily 
translate into a multiracial society, however, and here the foun-
ders' vision can be faulted. They had severe doubts about the 
desirability, and even the possibility, of a multiracial society.70 
Equality of rights does not connote equality of abilities, and dif-
ferences in abilities exacerbate the practical difficul-
ties71-difficulties that exist so long as real racial prejudices re-
main72-in creating and maintaining a society consisting of 
several races. 
Principle, the equality of rights, and practicality, the diffi-
culty of dealing with racial differences and prejudices, may ap-
pear irreconcilable, but many of the founders did not believe so. 
A reconciliation that was simple theoretically was available: sep-
arate nations. As Herbert Storing has explained, "To concede 
the Negro's [and here we can add the Indian's] right to freedom 
is not to concede his right to United States citizenship."73 Fully 
consistent with the principles of the Declaration, blacks and In-
dians could secure their natural rights in polities that they con-
trolled themselves.74 Indeed, colonization of blacks (in Liberia, 
supra note 50, at 320. 
70. See Storing, supra note 50, at 327-29 (difficulties of multiracial society). 
71. Jefferson discussed Indians and blacks from the perspective of a scientist in his 
Notes on the State of Virginia, see supra note 52, and he found them lacking many 
fundamental skills. "Jefferson did conclude that this inferiority was an obstacle to Negro 
emancipation; but the reason was not that it makes Negroes less entitled to liberty than 
whites. . . . Negro inferiority hindered emancipation . . . because it increased the diffi-
culty of knowing how to do deal with Negroes, once freed." Storing, supra note 50, at 
220. Perceived inferiority in no way justified black slavery. Differences in abilities exist 
among members of the same racial group, and, as Lincoln saw only too well, if a man of 
superior ability may justly enslave a man of inferior ability, there is nothing in principle 
to prevent the enslavement of whites by whites. See 2 CoLLECTED WoRKS, supra note 65, 
at 222, 223 reprinted in H. JAFFA, supra note 60, at 336 (emphasis in original) ("You 
mean the whites are intellectually the superiors of the blacks, and, therefore have the 
right to enslave them? Take care .... By this rule, you are to be slave to the first man 
you meet, with an intellect superior to your own."). 
72. There is a natural prejudice that prompts men to despise whoever has been 
their inferior long after he has become their equal; and the real inequality that 
is produced by fortune or by law is always succeeded by an imaginary inequal-
ity that is implanted in the manners of the people. 
1 A. DE TocQUEVILLE, supra note 23, at 357. 
73. Storing, supra note 50, at 328. "There is nothing contradictory in arguing that 
while the Negroes have a human right to be free, they do not have a human right to be 
citizens of the United States." Id. at 328-29; see supra note 57. But see J. FRANKLIN, 
RACIAL EQUALITY IN AMERICA 24 (1976). 
74. "Unless there was to be a permanent class of underlings, Negro emancipation 
had to imply either political and social equality of the races in the United States or 
separation of the races into distinct polities." Storing, supra note 50, at 329. 
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for example) was seen by many whites, and by many blacks, as 
the only solution 711 when full political and social equality in a 
single nation seemed impossible. 76 
For the Indian population, which was already segregated 
into distinct nations, the answer that paralleled colonization of 
blacks was maintaining their segregated status.77 When Indian 
nations impinged upon the American states within which they 
were located-and impingement was all but inevitable78-the re-
75. The American Colonization Society, founded in 1817 to further deportation of 
blacks to Liberia, had among its adherents John Marshall, James Madison, and James 
Monroe. S. ELKINS, SLAVERY 178 (2d ed. 1968). Whether colonization was ever a practical 
concept is doubtful, given the large number of blacks within the United States. See W. 
JoRDAN, supra note 48, at 566-69. The Liberian colonization effort at its height involved 
a minuscule number of former slaves. 
76. Jefferson wished for the emancipation of blacks, but coupled with their 
expatriation. 
Why not retain and incorporate the blacks into the State ... ? Deep-rooted 
prejudices entertained by the whites; ten thousand recollections, by the blacks, 
of the injuries they have sustained; new provocations; the real distinctions 
which nature has made; and many other circumstances, will divide us into par-
ties, and produce convulsions, which will probably never end but in the exter-
mination of the one or the other race. 
Among the Romans emancipation required but one effort. The slave, when 
made free, might mix with, without staining the blood of his master. But with 
us a second is necessary, unknown to history. When freed, he is to be removed 
beyond the reach of mixture. · 
T. JEFFERSON, NoTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA, query xiv, reprinted in SELECTED WRIT-
INGS, supra note 52, at 256, 262. Furthermore, Jefferson thought that an emphasis on 
manumission of slaves could distract attention from the real concern, deportation. See G. 
WILLS, supra note 57, at 297. 
The belief that colonization was necessary was common. It was held as well by Lin-
coln, at least through the early years of the Civil War. See Current, Introduction, in THE 
POLITICAL THOUGHT OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN xvi, xxvi (R. Current ed. 1967); A. MANN, 
supra note 41, at 88. Lincoln's only audience as President with a black delegation was 
held, in 1862, to urge emigration. The meeting followed the enactment of statutes that 
freed slaves both in the District of Columbia and within the Union Army and that ap-
propriated funds for resettlement. See THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN, 
supra, at 207 (reprinting N.Y. Tribune, August 15, 1862, report of the meeting). 
77. Although Jefferson spoke and wrote in favor of removing the Indian tribes be-
yond the western boundaries of the United States, he preferred that Indians become 
farmers and ultimately mix with the white population. He had no such wishes for the 
black population. See W. JoRDAN, supra note 48, at 480-81. 
Another possibility was extinction, and some commentators thought extinction of 
the Indian inevitable. See 1 A. DE TocQUEVILLE, supra note 23, at 25 ("Their implacable 
prejudices, their uncontrolled passions, their vices, and still more, perhaps, their savage 
virtues, consigned them to inevitable destruction."), 342 ("I believe that the Indian na-
tions of North America are doomed to perish, and that whenever the Europeans shall be 
established on the shores of the Pacific Ocean, that race of men will have ceased to 
exist."). 
78. See, e.g., Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 593-94 (1832) (McLean, J., 
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sponse was removaF9 of the Indians to areas where, at least in 
theory, they could continue to rule themselves in a manner con-
sistent with their rights as men. 80 
Thus, the original understanding was that separate can be 
equal: members of distinct racial groups are equal because they 
share natural rights, but complete separation of the groups may 
be necessary for everyone to secure his rights. 81 A late eight-
eenth century commentator might well have seen the political 
futures of blacks and Indians, if there were to be futures, 82 pro-
ceeding along similar paths.83 Blacks would control their own 
destinies in commonwealths outside United States boundaries; 
Indians would maintain their traditional tribal structures also 
outside the United States. 
B. Why the Different Paths of Blacks and Indians? 
In 1787, neither the black man nor the Indian was part of 
concurring): 
The exercise of the power of self-government by the Indians, within a 
state, is undoubtedly contemplated to be temporary. 
At best they can enjoy a very limited independence within the boundaries 
of a state, and such a residence must always subject them to encroachments 
from the settlements around them; and their existence within a state, as a sep-
arate and independent community, may seriously embarrass or obstruct the 
operation of the state laws. If, therefore, it would be inconsistent with the po-
litical welfare of the states, and the social advance of their citizens, that an 
independent and permanent power should exist within their limits, this power 
must give way to the greater power which surrounds it, or seek its exercise 
beyond the sphere of state authority. 
79. See, e.g., A. DEBO, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE CHOCTAW REPUBLIC 49-57 (2d ed. 
1961) (describing removal of Choctaws beyond the Mississippi River); R. SATZ, AMERICAN 
INDIAN POLICY IN THE JACKSONIAN ERA 1-125 (1975) (describing removal of eastern Indi-
ans beyond the Mississippi); B. SHEEHAN, SEEDS OF EXTINCTION: JEFFERSONIAN PHILAN-
THROPY AND THE AMERICAN INDIAN 243-75 (1973) (discussing removal). 
80. [W]e cannot err in anticipating a progressive diminution of their numbers, 
and their eventual extinction, unless our border should· become stationary, 
and they be removed beyond it, or unless some radical change should take 
place in the principles of our intercourse with them, which it is easier to hope 
for than to expect. 
1 A. DE TocQUEVILLE, supra note 23, at 342 n.9 (quoting a Mr. Cass) (emphasis added). 
81. See G. WILLS, supra note 57, at 306. · 
82. See supra notes 77, 80 (possibility of extinction). 
83. Cf. 1 A. DE TocQUEVILLE, supra note 23, at 332: 
These two unhappy races he.ve nothing in common, neither birth, nor features, 
nor language, nor habits. Their only resemblance lies in their misfortunes. 
Both of them occupy an equally inferior position in the country they inhabit; 
both suffer from tyranny; and if their wrongs are not the same, they originate 
from the same authors [the white race]. 
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"the People" engaged in forming "a more perfect Union."84 Al-
though neither was given . the opportunity to participate in the 
new regime, most of the founders hoped that eventually each 
would be able to secure his natural rights in his own society. In 
1987, both blacks and Indians are citizens of the American re-
public, and yet their legal status is markedly different. Due to 
the civil rights movement, which fought for the full application 
of American principles to the black man,85 the fear that a multi-
racial society is impossible has been officially discarded, and the 
premises on which that fear was based have been repudiated. 
Although the results have been imperfect, we are openly and 
proudly a multiracial society-without the full participation of 
the Indian. 
Providing justifications for an equal rights policy that in 
general treats the American Indian differentlyfrom other Amer-
ican citizens is not an easy theoretical task, and it has enormous 
practical consequences: one of the arguable costs of separation 
has been the degraded condition in which many Indians have 
lived on reservations. 86 Several overlapping rationales for the 
different treatment will be examined: the different historical ex-
periences of the Indian and the black and the resulting special 
legal status of Indian tribes, the modern allure of cultural rela-
tivism, the elevation of pluralism from a descriptive to a norma-
tive concept, and prudence. 
1. History and legal status of tribes 
Indians and blacks have had diametric histories in this 
country. 
84. U.S. CoNsT. preamble. 
85. Rather than rejecting the principles of the Declaration and the Constitution, the 
movement generally accepted them and insisted on their extension to all Americans. See 
Storing, supra note 38, at 4-5. 
86. "The first Americans-the Indians-are the most deprived and most isolated 
minority group in our nation. On virtually every scale of measurement-employment, 
income, education, health-the condition of the Indian people ranks at the bottom." 
1970 Nixon Message, supra note 34, at 564. According to the 1980 census, over 25% of 
the Indian population was living below the poverty level, compared with 12.4% for the 
non-Indian population. See Strickland, supra note 13, at 717. Although conditions are 
improving, particularly in health care and education, see D. GETCHES & C. WILKINSON, 
supra note 13, at 9-11, the disparity between Indian and non-Indian populations remains 
significant. See also S. BRAKEL, supra note 8, at 12-15 (description of reservation life); A. 
SORKIN, AMERICAN INDIANS AND FEDERAL Am 1 (1971) ("An Indian reservation can be 
characterized as an open-air slum."). 
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Indians started with everything and have gradually lost much 
of what they had to an advancing alien civiliztltion. Other mi-
norities have had no separate governmental institutions. Their 
goal primarily has been and continues to be to make the ex-
isting system involve them and work for them. Indian tribes 
have always been separate political entities interested in main-
taining their own institutions and beliefs. Their goal has been 
to prevent the dismantling of their own systems. So while other 
minorities have sought integration into the larger society, much 
of Indian society is motivated to retain its political and cul-
tural separateness. 87 
Indians originally were able to maintain their separateness 
because attempts to enslave them were largely unsuccessful. 
Historians have provided many explanations for this somewhat 
surprising fact: Indian pride, which made death seem preferable 
even to mingling with western Europeans;88 the Indian's lack of 
an agrarian tradition, which left him "physically and psychologi-
cally incapable of adjusting to plantation life";89 the ease with 
which an enslaved Indian could escape into familiar country and 
friendly hands; the self-preservation need of white settlers to 
maintain friendly relations with surrounding Indian popula-
tions;90 and the insufficient number of Indians to meet a large 
demand for labor.91 Perhaps reflecting practicality more than 
87. U.S. CoMMISSION ON CrVIL RIGHTS, INDIAN TRIBES: A CoNTINUING QuEsT FOR SuR-
VIVAL 32-33 (1981). 
88. See 1 A. DE TocQUEVILLE, supra note 23, at 334-36. Whether that broad proposi-
tion is true or not, it certainly is true that Indians proved "extremely recalcitrant" to 
wester~ization. See W. JoRDAN, supra note 48, at 89-90; Tann~nbaum, Toward an Ap-
preciation of Latin America, in THE UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 46-53 (H. Mat-
thews 2d ed. 1963), excerpted as Slavery, the Negro, and Racial Prejudice, in SLAVERY 
IN THE NEw WoRLD 3-7 (L. Foner & E. Genovese eds. 1969); see also Johnson v. Mcin-
tosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 590 (1823) (emphasis added): 
The Europeans were under the necessity either of abandoning the country, and 
relinquishing their pompous claims to it, or of enforcing those claims by the 
sword, and by the adoption of principles adapted to the condition of a people 
with whom it was impossible to mix, and who could not be governed as a dis-
tinct society, or of remaining in their neighbourhood, and exposing themselves 
and their families to the perpetual hazard of being massacred. 
89. "That life was so utterly strange and foreign to him that there was literally 
nothing in it to sustain his will to live." S. ELKINS, supra note 75, at 94 n.17; W. JoRDAN, 
supra note 48, at 89; R. UNDERHILL, RED MAN'S AMERICA: A HISTORY OF INDIANS IN THE 
UNITED STATES 67' 87 (1953). 
90. K. STAMPP, THE PECULIAR INSTITUTION: SLAVERY IN THE ANTE-BELLUM SOUTH 23-
24 (1963). 
91. The international black slave trade was a readier and more plentiful source of 
laborers; R. SANDERS, LOST TRIBES AND PROMISED LANDS: THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN RA-
CISM 357 (1978). 
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principle, early laws prohibited enslavement of Indians but not 
other non-white individuals.92 
Because they were separate and because they were seen as 
nations (as blacks, uprooted from their past, could not be), Indi-
ans have occupied a special place in American law from the 
founding. The tribes are granted an exalted constitutional posi-
tion that is denied other segments of the American population 
(in the Indian Commerce Clause),93 they have consistently been 
viewed as retaining elements of sovereignty,94 and they were ac-
cordingly often dealt with by treaty.95 The relationship of the 
92. K STAMPP, supra note 90, at 23-24. 
93. Congress is given power "[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and 
among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes." U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 
(emphasis added). Madison understood the clause as clarifying the primacy of the fed-
eral government over Indian lands and thus eliminating the problems caused by state 
claims of jurisdiction. Article IX of the Articles of Confederation had provided to Con-
gress "the sole and exclusive right and power of . . . regulating the trade and managing 
all affairs with the Indians, not members of any of the States, provided that the legisla-
tive right of any State within its own limits be not infringed or violated." ARTICLES OF 
CoNFEDERATION, art. ix (U.S. 1777). 
The regulation of commerce with the Indian tribes is very properly unfet-
tered from two limitations in the Articles of Confederation, which render the 
provision obscure and contradictory .... What description of Indians are to be 
deemed members of a State, is not yet settled, and has been a question of 
frequent perplexity and contention in the federal councils. And how the trade 
with Indians, though not members of a State, yet residing within its legislative 
jurisdiction, can be regulated by an external authority, without so far intruding 
on the internal rights of legislation, is absolutely incomprehensible. This is not 
the only case in which the Articles of Confederation have inconsiderately en-
deavored to accomplish impossibilities; to reconcile a partial sovereignty in the 
Union, with complete sovereignty in the States; to subvert a mathematical ax-
iom, by taking away a part, and letting the whole remain. 
THE FEDERALIST No. 42, at 306 (J. Madison) (B. Wright ed. 1961); see also 1 THE 
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CoNVENTION OF 1787 316 (M. Farrand ed. 1927) (Madison notes 
on June 19 that, under Articles, transactions with Indians "appertain to Congs. Yet in 
several instances, the States have entered into treaties & wars with them."). 
Indians are also specifically mentioned at two other points in the Constitution. For 
purposes of calculating state representation in the United States House of Representa-
tives and for apportioning direct taxes, "Indians not taxed" are excluded. U.S. CoNST. 
art. I, § 2, cl. 3; U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV, § 2. Clinton argues that this exclusion from 
enumeration is further evidence of Indians' "legal and political autonomy ... exempt 
from federal and state control over their internal affairs." Clinton, Book Review, 47 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 846, 851 (1980). 
94. See infra notes 171-77 and accompanying text. 
95. See supra note 26. "The Indian tribes were recognized as powers capable of 
making treaties before the United States was." 1942 CoHEN HANDBOOK, supra note 25, at 
274, quoted in Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 617 F.2d 537, 549 (lOth Cir. 1980) 
(McKay, J., concurring), aff'd, 455 U.S. 130 (1982). 
These treaties continue to have force. The 1871 Act ending treaty-making specifi-
cally provided that treaties then in force were not to be impaired. Indian Appropriations 
,j 
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United States with the tribes has approximated that of govern-
ments dealing with one another,96 rather than ·that of govern-
ment and constituent racial group. Preferential legal treatment 
of Indians97 therefore generally avoids the potential constitu-
tional and statutory infirmities associated with racial discrimina-
tion, although that treatment appears in many respects to be 
contrary to the spirit of the nation's civil rights policy.98 
The Indians' historical and legal separation has colored the 
way the rest of the population views them. The history of 
United States black-white relations has not been a happy one, 
but there have been positive aspects to this country's facing a 
problem that much of the rest of the world has been able either 
to ignore or to treat as a purely abstract proposition.99 The black 
American essayist James Baldwin eloquently contrasted his al-
ways uneasy presence in a Swiss village, where he spent several 
winters, with his experience in the United States: 
[T]he interracial drama acted out on the American continent 
Act, ch. 120, 16 Stat. 544, 566 (1871) (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 71 (1982)); see supra note 
26. 
96. Although one of the governments was far more powerful than the others, the 
relationship resembling that of a guardian to his wards, "a weaker power does not sur-
render its independence-its right to self-government, by associating with a stronger and 
taking its protection." Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 561 (1832), quoted in 
Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 617 F.2d 537, 549 (lOth Cir. 1980) (McKay, J., concur-
ring), aff'd, 455 U.S. 130 (1982). 
97. See, e.g., supra note 30 (describing Equal Employment Opportunity Act's inap-
plicability to Indian tribes). 
98. Felix Cohen, see supra note 19, most vigorously promoted the proposition that 
the differential treatment of Indians is based not on race, but on their constitutionally 
protected tribal status. See Cohen, Indian Rights and the Federal Courts, 24 MINN. L. 
REv. 145, 186 (1940). Vieira, however, has demonstrated that many older Indian cases 
and statutes were, in fact, racially based. Nevertheless, for a number of reasons, includ-
ing the "attitudes of white supremacy" reflected in such cases, he urged that the prefer-
ential precedents not be extended to other minority racial groups. See Vieira, Racial 
Imbalance, Black Separatism, and Permissible Classification by Race, 67 MICH. L. REv. 
1553, 1577-82 (1969). 
99. It [the question of the black man's humanity and thus his rights] is an 
argument which Europe has never had, and hence Europe quite sincerely fails 
to understand how or why the argument arose in the first place, why its effects 
are so frequently disastrous and always so unpredictable, why it refuses until 
today to be entirely settled. Europe's black possessions remained ... in Eu-
rope's colonies, at which remove they represented no threat whatever to Euro-
pean identity. If they posed any problem at all for the European conscience, it 
was a problem which remained comfortingly abstract: in effect, the black man, 
as a man, did not exist for Europe. 
J. BALDWIN, Stranger in the Village, in·NoTES OF A NATIVE SoN 159, 170 (1955) (empha-
sis in original). 
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has not only created a new black man, it has created a new 
white man, too. No road whatever will lead Americans back to 
the simplicity of this European village where white men still 
have the luxury of looking on me as a stranger. I am not, really, 
a stranger any longer for any American alive. One of the things 
that distinguishes Americans from other people is that no 
other people has ever been so deeply involved in the lives of 
black men, and vice versa. This fact faced, with all its implica-
tions, it can be seen that the history of the American Negro 
problem is not merely shameful, it is also something of ·an 
achievement. For even when the worst has been said, it must 
also be added that the perpetual challenge posed by this prob-
lem was always, some how, perpetually met.100 
The American experience, tense and fitful as it has been, proved 
Tocqueville wrong, at least in part. 
While nineteenth and twentieth century white Americans 
have inevitably had to deal with the presence of the black man, 
most have been able to ignore the Indian. It was not that they 
had no image of the Indian; indeed, the images of the noble sav-
age and the warlike savage were pervasive/01 as well as contra-
dictory. Nor was it because white Americans were necessarily 
hostile. Rather, it was that those images were purely abstract. 
White Americans for the most part had no occasion to develop 
any impression of the Indian based on experience102 because the 
100. Id. at 175. Originally published in 1953, the words are those of a young and 
relatively optimistic James Baldwin. Unfortunately the optimism had largely disap-
peared in the Introduction to a new edition of the essays. See J. BALDWIN, Introduction 
to the New Edition, in NoTES OF A NATIVE SoN ix, xvi (Beacon paperback 1984) ("No 
promise was kept with [my ancestors], no promise was kept with me, nor can I counsel 
those coming after me, nor my global kinsmen, to believe a word uttered by Iriy morally 
bankrupt and desperately dishonest countrymen."). 
101. SeeM. KAMMEN, PEOPLE OF PARADOX: AN INQUIRY CoNCERNING THE ORIGINS OF 
AMERICAN CIVILIZATION 255-56 (1972); 1 F. PRUCHA, supra note 34, at 6-9; see generally 
R. BERKHOFER, THE WHITE MAN'S INDIAN: IMAGES OF THE AMERICAN INDIAN FROM CoLUM-
BUS TO THE PRESENT (1978); R. SLOTKIN, REGENERATION THROUGH VIOLENCE: THE 
MYTHOLOGY OF THE AMERICAN FRONTIER, 1600-1860 (1973). "There is a tendency in our 
literature to make the Indian-in-general an enemy but the Indian-in-particular a noble 
savage." R. BARTLETT, THE NEw CouNTRY: A SociAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN FRONTIER, 
1776-1890, at 19 (1974) (citing Cooper's Chingachgook and the Lone Ranger's Tonto as 
examples of the "Indian-in-particular"); see also Williams, The Medieval and Renais-
sance Origins of the Status of the American Indian in Western Legal Thought, 57 S. 
CAL. L. REv. 1, 93 (1983) (tracing role of Indian in legal thought to "medievally derived 
conceptions of the propriety and necessity of assimilating alien, non-Christian civiliza-
tions to idealized European normative conceptions of social, political, and cultural 
organizations"). 
102. Whites in towns bordering on Indian reservations are exceptions. They have 
developed impressions of Indians, often hostile. See, e.g., Johnson, Indian Hunting 
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Indian was physically separated, 103 a separation encouraged by 
law, and whites therefore could continue to treat the Indian as a 
"stranger in the village," a curiosity. 
History and the law arising from that history thus help ex-
plain why Indians and blacks have assumed different positions 
in American society. Yet, neither history nor the Constitution 
can fully justify the difference.104 Much of modern civil rights 
policy is an attempt to redress the effects of history, not to glo-
rify them.1011 Moreover, the question about differential treatment 
of Indians and other minorities is not just a technical legal one. 
If differential treatment is to exist, it must, of course, conform 
to legal requirements, including the dictates of the Constitution. 
However, even if the special constitutional position of the Indian 
provides a sufficient legal basis for the present policy of separa-
tion-and there appears to be little doubt on that score106-the 
Rights Ignite a Wisconsin Dispute, N.Y. Times, May 16, 1987, at 8, coL 1 (describing ill 
feeling between whites and Indians after federal judge ruled, on basis of 1837 treaty, that 
Chippewa tribe had hunting and fishing rights extending beyond the reservation); cf. 
United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384 (1886) ("Because of the local ill feeling, the 
people of the States where [Indians] are found are often their deadliest enemies."). 
103. The textual statement is a gross generalization, of course. Many Indians have 
been fully assimilated over the years, and others, in time honored immigrant fashion, 
have formed enclaves within American cities. Moreover; there are substantial tribal con-
centrations near population centers, such as Phoenix, Seattle, and Miami. C. WILKINSON, 
supra note 12, at 25. 
104. Hoxie sees the experiences of blacks in the Harlem renaissance, Jews in the 
urban ghetto, and Catholics responding to the "nativist hysteria of the 1920s" as models 
for the Indian. "Rejection and exclusion-confinement in their 'proper station' in the 
social hierarchy-bred self-consciousness, resourcefulness, and aggressive pride." F. 
HoxiE, supra note 34, at 244. But those groups, while they did "carry on their war with 
homog'eneity," id., were also asking to become part of the larger society, not to separate 
from it. 
105. The Supreme Court, in Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974), upheld the 
policy of the Bureau of Indian Affairs to give preference in hiring to members of recog-
nized tribes, by stating that, "[i]f these laws, derived from historical relationships and 
explicitly designed to help only Indians, were deemed invidious racial discrimination, an 
entire Title of the United States Code (25 U.S.C.) would be effectively erased." Id. at 
552. Barsh and Henderson respond: "It should be kept in mind that the magnitude of an 
unconstitutional abuse of power is no justification of its continuance." R. BARSH & J. 
HENDERSON, supra note 35, at 242; see also infra text accompanying notes 173-79 (ques-
tioning whether one group should be legally disadvantaged with respect to another group 
because of history). 
106. See Washington v. Confederated Bands & Tribes, 439 U.S. 463, 500-01 (1979) 
("It is settled that 'the unique legal status of Indian tribes .. .' permits the Federal 
Government to enact legislation singling out tribal Indians[.]" (quoting Morton v. Man-
cari, 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974))); United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641 (1977) (federal 
regulation of Indians not based on race); Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382 (1976) 
(denying access to state court to tribal members not impermissible racial discrimination; 
exclusive jurisdiction of tribal court derives from quasi-sovereign status of tribes); supra 
1103] JUDGE MONROE G. McKAY 1129 
broader moral question remains: Can separate really be equal, as 
the Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of Education107 under-
stood equality?108 With a policy of separation, are the principles, 
if not the legal requirements, of Brown violated? 
Separation as it now exists certainly does not secure the 
equality contemplated by the founders.109 A separatist policy 
grounded in preemptive federal power-the controlling image, in 
its most extreme form, is that of a federal guardian and an In-
dian ward110-stresses dependency and raises "the specter of 
maintaining a sort of federally sanctioned serfdom in the face of 
a broad based expansion of civil rights."m Moreover, it is proba-
bly too late in the day to seriously consider complete separation 
coupled with real tribal power.112 Tribal power that is not sub-
ject to ultimate federal control would come closer to the original 
understanding of equality; but, even if politically possible, such 
separation would condemn the members of those tribes without 
substantial resources to perpetual poverty. 
Reconciliation of separation and equality as understood by 
the Supreme Court may be even more difficult. If a way out of 
this impasse exists-and that is not a given-it may be provided 
by the implications of the social science research cited in foot-
note 11 of Brown.113 If neither the American Indian nor any 
not<1s 93-98 and accompanying text; see also Rosenfelt, Indian Schools and Community 
Control, 25 STAN. L. REV. 489, 530-50 (1973) (concluding that creation of separate Indian 
school districts is legally permissible). 
107. 347 u.s. 483 (1954). 
108. See supra note 39. The Court concluded that "[s]eparate educational facilities 
are inherently unequal." 347 U.S. at 495. Moreover, Brown stressed the fundamental 
importance, and the traditional civilizing role, of education: 
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local 
governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures 
for education both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education 
to our democratic society .... It is the very foundation of good citizenship. 
Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in 
preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust nor-
mally to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child may rea-
sonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an 
education. 
I d. at 493. In the Court's view, training for citizenship in a pluralist society thus seems to 
require education in common values, but with as diverse a student body as possible. 
109. See supra notes 41-83 and accompanying text. 
110. The image dates to Justice Marshall's opinion in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 
30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831), and is now often reiterated to justify federal stewardship. 
111. C. WILKINSON, supra note 12, at 25. 
112. But see supra note 35 and the materials cited therein. 
113. Footnote 11 of Brown cited psychological and sociological authority in support 
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other segment of the population has developed a feeling ofinfer-
iority from the policy of separation, then the policy may be con-
sistent with the moral and legal result in Brown. 114 If the poten-
tially stigmatized party, the Indian, does not object, perhaps 
others should also refrain. m 
Unfortunately, the "no stigma" rationale is not entirely per-
suasive. For one thing, it would curiously make separation more 
defensible as it becomes more complete;116 awareness of inequal-
ity and any resulting feeling of inferiority are lessened as separa-
tion increases.117 In addition, like any other legal or quasi-legal 
theory, the limits of the "no stigma" rationale should be tested 
in the way Judge McKay tests a litigant's theory in his court: by 
questioning the theory's application to other factual situations. 
So tested, as the following example demonstrates, the "no 
stigma" theory has severe flaws. 
Suppose that a group of black Americans decides to with-
draw from American society, rejecting the prevailing integration-
ist rhetoric, and to form a self-governing community, Newtown, 
in an isolated area of the United States. The group cannot alto-
gether escape the larger society unless it leaves the country be-
cause it will remain subject to the laws of the United States and 
of its home state.118 Nevertheless, the creation of a single-race 
of the proposition that "[t)o separate [black elementary and high school children from 
white children] of similar age and qualifications solely because of their race generates a 
feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts and 
minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone." 347 U.S. at 494. 
114. Cf. Rosenfelt, supra note 107, at 548 ("While historically Indians have suffered 
their share of discrimination, the federal policy of tribal independence, coupled with de-
mands from the Indian community, provides a nondiscriminatory basis for the creation 
of Indian school districts."). 
Focusing on perceptions of inequality is more than a little perverse. See H. JAFFA, 
supra note 60, at 11 ("the opinion of the court [in Brown] was most unwise, because it 
gave credit to the opinion that the feeling of equality was identical to equality itself") 
(emphasis in original). 
115. See A. JOSEPHY, JR., supra note 34, at 347: 
[D]ifference, to most non-Indians in the United States[,) implies being inferior, 
and most people with a guilt complex about Indians wish they would stop be-
ing inferior so the guilt complex would go away! To the Indian, the concept 
that being different means being inferior remains-as it has been for almost 
five hundred years-one of the principal obstacles to his survival. But, ironi-
cally, he now views it increasingly . . . as a concept which the white man must 
soon shed if he, the white man, expects to survive. 
116. It would be more defensible if the separation were accompanied by full self-
rule. See supra notes 41-83 and accompanying text. 
117. Cf. supra text accompanying note 100. 
118. No attempt is made here to reconsider whether a right of secession exists. 
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enclave by itself should not threaten the values of Brown. Many 
American small towns are racially homogeneous, black or white, 
and that fact implicates no necessarily reprehensible principle. 
Moreover, if the Newtown government plausibly announces that 
its original racial composition is a reflection of individual choice, 
not of any belief in an inherent racial hierarchy, the case for the 
larger society's indifference is even stronger. 
But now suppose that Newtown openly adopts racially de-
fined admissions criteria, either by ordinance or by a pattern of 
practice. Should the rest of the American polity indicate its ap-
proval of such an exclusionary policy?119 If that question is an-
swered in the negative-and, whether or not a stigmatized plain-
tiff exists, it should be120-then those who would justify a policy 
of separation for the American Indian must find a principled ba-
sis to distinguish the two cases. The fact of separation is one 
thing. The federal government's legitimation of racially based 
separation, 121 even when no stigma is apparently involved, is 
quite another.122 The separatist policy of American Indian law 
receives the government's imprimatur; the exclusionary policy of 
Newtown would not and should not. 
119. To make the issue as stark as possible, assume that all of the residents are 
adults who participated knowingly in the formation of the community. This assumption 
is intended to eliminate some issues that could not be eliminated in the real world, such 
as *he effect of separation on the unknowing-for example, a child who, because of his 
isolation from the larger society, is unable to evaluate the alternatives that would other-
wise have been available to him. Cf. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 242-43 (1972) 
(Douglas, J., dissenting in part) (since desires of parents and children may diverge, it is 
necessary to take into account rights of both groups in determining whether state can 
require compulsory school attendance of Amish children). 
120. The answer should be negative if three decades of civil rights activity are not to 
be repudiated, and it should be negative even if there is currently no complainant to 
challenge the policy. The issue raised here is not standing to sue, but rather whether the 
federal government should be indicating its approval of such a racially defined policy in 
a case in which none of the traditional justifications for affirmative action is present. In 
fact, the separatist policy is the antithesis of affirmative action. 
121. Whether or not the cases view a tribe's determination of its membership as 
potentially racial in character, it requires little imagination to see it as precisely that. Cf. 
C. WILKINSON, supra note 12, at 6 ("how can the United .States ... allow race-based 
Indian tribes to govern the non-Indians who have lawfully entered those [reservation] 
lands ... ?"). To be sure, a tribe will exclude other Indians as well as whites and blacks 
from its membership, see supra note 30 (description of Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 
(1974)), but that fact does not lessen the fundamentally racial nature of the classifica-
tion. Whites-only country clubs exclude whites as well as blacks, and they are no less 
racially discriminatory for that reason. 
122. The question, to reiterate, is not whether the federal government can legally 
distinguish between the black and the Indian populations. The question is whether such 
a distinction is consistent with the underlying moral principles of Brown. 
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History serves many functions, but it cannot provide the 
distinguishing principle for these two cases. If on the basis of 
history Indians, but not blacks, are permitted to adopt an exclu-
sionary policy that is racial in nature, black Americans are im-
plicitly accorded a lower status solely because their history was 
torn from them.128 Prior deprivation should not be used to legiti-
mize a currently discriminatory policy. 
2. Cultural relativism 
An additional justification that is often provided for separa-
tion is cultural relativism, a concept that has been derived (un-
critically) from the research of anthropologists. From the un-
questionable premise that other cultures are very different from 
our own, inferences are drawn about our society: either that it is 
nothing special or, equivalently, that every culture is equally 
special. The study of other societies thus shows only that there 
are no values of overriding importance. 124 If other cultures are 
no better or worse than our own-if everything is "rela-
tive" -there is no reasoned basis for expecting any cultural 
group, including the Indian, to subordinate any of its values to 
the shared goals of a larger society. 
This argument, which necessarily rejects natural rights, 1211 is 
not the theory of the founders. They believed they were creating 
something demonstrably superior to that which existed else-
where. Nor is it the theory of the Constitution, except in the 
minds of those who believe that document to be infinitely malle-
123. See infra text accompanying note 179 (quotation from McKay opinion on ef-
fect of adverse history on rights). 
124. E.g., R. STRICKLAND, supra note 8, at xiv ("[W]e cannot judge the laws of a 
people by the standards of the people of another time and another place. To do so does 
violence to the very nature of the concept of law as a living institution."); Deloria, Mi-
norities and the Social Contract, 20 GA. L. REv. 917, 920 (1986) ("Self-evident truths are 
generally limited to the era in history in which they are accepted with minimal critical 
examination."). 
125. See A. BLOOM, supra note 11, at 27: 
The recent education of openness ... pays no attention to natural rights 
or the historical origins of our regime, which are now thought to have been 
essentially flawed and regressive. . . . It does not demand fundamental agree-
ment or the abandonment of old or new beliefs in favor of the natural ones. It 
is open to all kinds of men, all kinds of life-styles, all ideologies. There is no 
enemy other than the man who is not open to everything. But when there are 
no shared goals or vision of the public good, is the social contract any longer 
possible? 
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able. Certainly the existence of different cultures does not prove 
the rightness of cultural relativism. As Leo Strauss explained: 
[B]y proving that there is no principle of justice that has not 
been denied somewhere or at some time, one has not yet 
proved that any given denial was justified or reasonable. Fur-
thermore, it has always been known that different notions of 
justice obtain at different times and in different nations. It is 
absurd to claim that the discovery of a still greater number of 
such notions by modern students has in any way affected the 
fundamental issue.126 
A nation, particularly this nation, must have shared values 
to unify its constituent parts. For better or for worse, some val-
ues are so fundamental that their denial (even though they have 
been denied elsewhere) is a repudiation of the American re-
gime.127 The moral principles of Brown are arguably among 
those superior values;128 governmentally supported separation, 
as a general matter, creates a fissure in the nation's philosophi-
cal foundation. Are Americans prepared, in the name of cultural 
relativism, to permit any group successfully to repudiate the 
principles of Brown?129 
In denying the force of cultural relativism, the assertion 
made here is not that distinct cultural attributes must disappear 
from the American polity. America has never been homogene-
ous, and it certainly cannot be so now. The argument is only 
that values inconsistent with core values are less deserving of 
126. L. STRAUSS, NATURAL RIGHT AND HISTORY 9-10 (1953). 
127. That a person may be able to repudiate the principles in speech or print with-
out adverse legal consequences is beside the point. The question is whether the position 
of the repudiator can prevail without changing the fundamental nature of the regime. 
For example, even if a speaker may escape prosecution for advocating the elimination of 
free speech, his advocacy cannot be successful within the existing constitutional 
structure. 
128. Cf. Dworkin, The Bork Nomination, 34 N.Y. REv. BooKs, Aug. 13, 1987, at 3, 3: 
[Brown] has ... become so firmly accepted, and so widely hailed as a para-
digm of constitutional statesmanship, that it acts as an informal test of consti-
tutional theories. No theory seems acceptable that condemns that decision as a 
mistake. (I doubt that any Supreme Court nominee would be confirmed if he 
now said that he thought it wrongly decided.). 
129. Another, rather bizarre perspective on cultural relativism is provided in Bryan, 
Cultural Relativism-Power in Service of Interests: The Particular Case of Native 
American Education, 32 BuFFALO L. REv. 643 (1983). "The story of relativism," Bryan 
emotes, "is a story of power; power disguised as tolerance, disguised as neutrality, dis-
guised as respect for other perspectives." I d. at 645. "Under the guise of neutrality, rela-
tivist doctrine has been used for the purpose of westernizing non-Western peoples, visit-
ing 'progress' on the world." Id. at 693. 
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preservation;130 one cannot logically infer from the fact that va-
rious persons adhere to a particular principle that the principle 
is a worthy one. If that proposition seems excessively ethnocen-
tric, and therefore contrary to the openness of cultural relativ-
ism, so be it. The proposition is, however, in accord with the 
teachings of anthropology. Despite differences in cultures, most 
(all?) share ethnocentric traits. In accepting a certain level of 
American ethnocentrism, this nation's ties with the rest of hu-
manity are reinforced. 131 
3. Pluralism 
Pluralist theory, as advanced in one branch of modern polit-
ical science, suggests am>ther justification for the distinctive sta-
tus of the Indian. Called by one critic "interest-group liber-
alism,"132 the theory purports not only to describe the operation 
of American politics, but also to rationalize the polity's division 
into a multitude of self-interested groups. 
Under pluralist theory, which is grounded in cultural rela-
tivism, groups are the building blocks of the polity. Groups may 
be formed on economic, regional, ethnic, or any other self-inter-
ested ground, and public policy results from group interplay and 
conflict.133 With power divided among the groups, the idealized 
pluralist regime has two salutary effects: protection against ex-
cessive accumulations of power in a central government and 
preservation of the power of the individual within the groups of 
which he is a member. 
Preservation of "Indianness" (or the characteristics of any 
other racial or ethnic group) may seem to fit neatly into the 
overall pluralist scheme, but the fit is illusory. Pluralist theory 
has never viewed America as a collection of discrete groups. 
130. See supra note 125. 
131. "For it is out of a deep feeling of respect toward cultures other than our own 
that the doctrine of cultural relativism was evolved; and it now appears that this doc-
trine is deemed unacceptable by the very people on whose behalf it was upheld." Levi-
Strauss, The Disappearance of Man, 7 N.Y. REv. BooKs, July 28, 1966, at 6, 7, quoted in 
Bryan, supra note 129, at 664 n.54. 
132. T. Lowr, THE END oF LIBERALISM: THE SECOND REPUBLIC oF THE UNITED STATES 
50-61 (2d ed. 1979); Lowi, The Public Philosophy: Interest-Group Liberalism, 61 AM. 
PoL. Scr. REV. 5 (1967); Lowi, American Business, Public Policy, Case-Studies, and Po-
litical Theory (Book Review), 16 WoRLD PoL. 677 (1964). 
133. In pluralism's most extreme form, government becomes merely "an interest 
group itself," A. BENTLEY, THE PROCESS OF GovERNMENT 219 (1908), quoted in D. TRu-
MAN, THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS 51 (1951), or a "potential interest group." D. TRUMAN, 
supra, at 51. 
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Groups are overlapping, constantly changing, as Arthur Mann 
has noted: 
America is not merely a collection of ethnic groups. Nor was it 
so in the past. There exists now as previously a complex of po-
litical, occupational, religious, civic, and neighborhood associa-
tions. They sometimes overlap with the ethnic, but the bound-
aries for the most part are fluid rather than fixed. Neither in 
practice nor in theory has America's historic pluralism con-
sisted of isolated· fortresses. 134 
The Indian tribal group is precisely the isolated fortress that 
does not fit within the pluralist framework. 
Indian tribes thus do not mesh with pluralism's descriptive 
model, and the model, which celebrates difference for the sake of 
difference, is also defective as prescription. The founders recog-
nized the inevitability of factionalism in a free society-THE 
FEDERALIST No. 10 is Madison's great statement on that sub-
ject185-and it is easy to move, as the pluralist theorists have 
done, from the inevitability of faction to its veneration. How-
ever, that was decidedly not the Madisonian position. The ef-
fects of faction were to be controlled, to prevent the success of 
the "schemes of oppression" that those with narrow interests 
might seek to implement. 136 Theodore Lowi has e~plained: 
"Modern pluralism turned the Madisonian position from nega-
tive to positive; that is, government is good because many fac-
tions do compete for its favor .... In contemporary pluralism 
... [g]roups become virtuous; they must be accommodated, not 
regulated. "137 
The pluralist framework subordinates principle to the con-
134. A. MANN, supra note 41, at 177 (emphasis in original). 
135. A faction is "a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or minority 
of the whole who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of 
interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate in-
terests of the community." THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 130 (J. Madison) (B. Wright ed. 
1961) (emphasis added). 
136. Id. at 81; see A. BLOOM, supra note.ll, at 31: 
For the Founders, minorities are in general bad things, mostly identical to fac-
tions, selfish groups who have no concern as such for the common good. Unlike 
older political thinkers, they entertained no hopes of suppressing factions and 
educating a united or homogeneous citizenry. Instead they constructed an 
elaborate machinery to contain factions in such a way that they would cancel 
one another and allow for the pursuit of the common good. The good is still 
the guiding consideration in their thought, although it is arrived at, less di-
rectly than in classical political thought, by tolerating faction. 
137. T. Lowi, supra note 132, at 35, 36. 
1136 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [1987 
frontation of interest groups, and, as a prescriptive model, 
should be rejected on that ground alone. With· no concern for 
the public interest, government is relegated to a secondary posi-
tion (another group in the logrolling arena).138 But pluralism's 
celebration of groups has an additional defect because it ignores 
the often antidemocratic nature of the groups themselves. 139 If 
the national political process consists primarily of group interac-
tions and the groups do not preserve democratic values within 
their own political houses, where is the protection in pluralist 
theory for those values? 
4. Prudence 
Neither history, cultural relativism, nor pluralism provides a 
satisfactory justification for separation. Simple prudence is also 
not fully satisfying, but it may come closer than the others. 
Some form of Indian separation has existed throughout the na-
tion's history. Separation is largely taken for granted, and its 
proponents are now motivated by good intentions. Furthermore, 
the dislocations from implementing any alternative might well 
be worse than the current state of affairs. Making the best of 
things as they are, while not the sort of idea that causes men to 
move mountains, has much to commend it. 
Prudence may explain the Supreme Court's decision in Wis-
consin v. Yoder. 140 The Court concluded that Wisconsin could 
not compel Old Order Amish children to attend public schools 
beyond the eighth grade. The reasoning in many ways seems 
138. See A. BENTLEY, supra note 133. "Modern political science usage took 
[Madison's definition of faction, see supra note 135] and cut the quotation just before 
the emphasized part." T. Lowr, supra note 132, at 55 (citing D. TRUMAN, supra note 134, 
at 4). 
139. See G. McCoNNELL, PRIVATE PoWER & AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 119-54 (1966) 
(discussing myth of democracy in labor unions). 
The concern is a real one. The Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 
82 Stat. 73 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-41 (1982)), was enacted in large part out of 
concern that tribal governments were able to limit the civil rights of tribal members, 
and, because the Constitution's Bill of Rights and various civil rights laws were inappli-
cable to tribes, see supra note 30; infra note 172, those members had no recourse under 
federal law. See SuscOMM. oN CoNSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, SENATE CoMM. ON JuDICIARY, 89TH 
CoNG., 2D SEss., CoNSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE AMERICAN INDIAN 3-7 (Comm. Print 
1965). TheAct has not entirely solved the problem; however, tribal courts often must 
resolve claims of abuse by tribal authorities. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 
U.S. 49 (1978) (federal court may not pass on validity under Indian Civil Rights Act 
(ICRA) of tribal ordinance denying tribal membership to children of certain female tri-
bal members; ICRA did not explicitly confer federal jurisdiction). 
140. 406 u.s. 205 (1972). 
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dramatically wrong, an undercutting of Brown's principles, 141 
but Yoder provides a result that seems absolutely right: the 
Amish-good, decent people-should not be disturbed. Not dis-
turbing people, letting them remain in their isolated fortresses, 
is not a principle this country ordinarily implements or should 
implement. In certain special cases, however-the Amish among 
them-the preservation of "idiosyncratic separateness"142 is an 
understandable goal. 
As Yoder demonstrates, it is difficult to articulate a separa-
tist justification while using the language, and the precedents, of 
equality. The language of the general principle is trampled in 
the attempt to fit the idiosyncratic case within an analytical 
structure not designed for it. Maybe we should give up the theo-
retical effort and simply extend the Amish principle-peculiar, 
nongeneralizable though it may be-to the Indian.143 The justifi-
cation for a separate body of Indian law may be uneasy/44 but 
separation has prudence on its side. 
III. THE McKAY OPINIONS 
A. The Judge's General Perspective 
Judge McKay's Indian law opinions can be divided roughly 
into five categories: (1) limitations on state jurisdiction on tribal 
141. Brown had stressed the importance of education in establishing shared values, 
see supra note 108, and Yoder is a retreat from that understanding. See Wisconsin v. 
Yoder, 406 U.S. at 225-26; id. at 238 (White, J., concurring) (quoting Brown language to 
emphasize state's interest in compulsory education). Education is intended to, and does, 
change people. But see SPECIAL SuBCOMM. ON INDIAN EDUCATION, supra note 17, at 10 
("The goal, from the beginning of attempts at formal education of the American Indian, 
has been not so much to educate him as to change him."); Gross, Indian Self-Determi· 
nation and Tribal Sovereignty: An Analysis of Recent Federal Indian Policy, 56 TEX. L. 
REV. 1195, 1204 (1978) (discussing Special Subcommittee report, which awakened politi-
cal leaders "to the critical link between education and political control"). 
142. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 226. 
It is hard to imagine why the state of Wisconsin felt compelled to prosecute this 
case. If nothing else, Yoder demonstrates that not all social issues are amenable to judi-
cial resolution. 
143. Because of their shared peculiarities, the two groups are often treated together 
for analytical purposes. See, e.g., A. MANN, supra note 41, at 161-62; Garet, Communal· 
ity and Existence: The Rights of Groups, 56 S. CAL. L. REv. 1001, 1029-36 (1983). 
144. With apologies to W. BLUM & H. KALVEN, THE UNEASY CASE FOR PROGRESSIVE 
TAXATION (1953). Professors Blum and Kalven were two of Judge McKay's teachers in 
law school, and rumor has it that the Judge's best grades came in Professor Blum's tax 
courses. Rumor even has it that Blum tried to convince the Judge to become a tax law-
yer. Good sense prevailed. See supra note 14 (Justice Blackmun's comments). 
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lands;145 (2) disputes involving Indian lands (including Indian 
claims cases);146 (3) federal court jurisdiction to near Indian law 
cases (including issues of tribal sovereign immunity);147 (4) fed-
eral court review of administrative decisions and the power of 
administrative agencies to interfere in tribal affairs;148 and (5) 
civil rights claims by non-Indians against tribes.149 These catego-
ries are not mutually exclusive; some cases partake of a wide va-
riety of issues. 
Each of the categories could easily justify a separate article; 
mercifully, each will not get one. To provide the maximum op-
portunity to let the Judge's language speak for itself, the discus-
sion in section B focuses on a single McKay opinion of substan-
tial scope, the relatively early decision in Mescalero Apache 
Tribe v. New Mexico150 (a category 1 case). 
Several themes permeate the Judge's work. He believes that 
outside forces, the state and federal governments, should inter-
fere minimally with the prerogatives of tribal self-government; 
he wishes to facilitate Indian self-determination.151 Accordingly, 
145. Iowa Tribe v. Kansas, 787 F.2d 1434 (lOth Cir. 1986); Mescalero Apache Tribe 
v. New Mexico, 630 F.2d 724 (lOth Cir. 1980), vacated, 450 U.S. 1036 (1981), decision on 
remand, 677 F.2d 55 (lOth Cir. 1982) (reinstating previous opinion), aff'd, 462 U.S. 324 
(1983); Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 617 F.2d 537, 549 (lOth Cir. 1980) (concurring 
opinion), aff'd, 455 U.S. 130 (1982); Mescalero Apache Tribe v. O'Cheskey, 625 F.2d 967, 
981 (lOth Cir. 1980) (dissenting opinion), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 959 (1981). 
146. Navajo Tribe v. New Mexico, 809 F.2d 1455 (lOth Cir. 1987); Millsap v. An-
drus, 717 F.2d 1326 (lOth Cir. 1983); Oklahoma Gas & Elec. Co. v. United States, 609 
F.2d 1365 (lOth Cir. 1979); Whiskers v. United States, 600 F.2d 1332 (lOth Cir. 1979), 
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1078 (1980); United States v. City of McAlester, 604 F.2d 42, 57 
(lOth Cir. 1979) (concurring in part and dissenting in part); Armstrong v. Maple Leaf 
Apartments, 622 F.2d 466, 474 (lOth Cir. 1979) (dissenting opinion), cert. denied, 449 
u.s. 901 (1980). 
147. Brooks v. Nance, 801 F.2d 1237 (lOth Cir. 1986); Tenneco Oil Co. v. Sac & Fox 
Tribe, 725 F.2d 572, 576 (lOth Cir. 1984) (concurring opinion); Ramey Constr. Co. v. 
Apache Tribe, 673 F.2d 315 (lOth Cir. 1982); Alamo Navajo School Bd. v. Andrus, 664 
F.2d 229 (lOth Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 963 (1982); Glover Constr. Co. v. An-
drus, 591 F.2d 554, 562 (lOth Cir. 1979) (dissenting opinion), aff'd, 446 U.S. 608 (1980). 
148. Wheeler v. Department of Interior, 811 F.2d 549 (lOth Cir. 1987); Pueblo de 
San Felipe v. Hodel, 770 F.2d 915 (lOth Cir. 1985); Kenai Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Department 
of Interior, 671 F.2d 383 (lOth Cir. 1982). 
149. Wardle v. Ute Indian Tribe, 623 F.2d 670 (lOth Cir. 1980). 
150. 630 F.2d 724 (lOth Cir. 1980), vacated, 450 U.S. 1036 (1981), decision on re-
mand, 677 F.2d 55 (lOth Cir. 1982) (reinstating previous opinion), aff'd, 462 U.S. 324 
(1983). 
151. Congress "recognizes the obligation of the United States to respond to the 
strong expression of the Indian people for self-determination." 25 U.S.C. § 450a(a) 
(1982). "Self-determination" may require federal aid and intervention, however. For ex-
ample, in a McKay opinion, the Tenth Circuit held that the Superintendent of the Bu-
reau of Indian Affairs was fulfilling his trust responsibility in rejecting, on purely eco-
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Judge McKay takes an expansive view of tribal sovereignty/52 
the powers a tribe derives from its traditional status as a nation, 
and he meticulously combs any applicable treaties, statutes, and 
regulations searching for sources and reaffirmations of tribal 
powers.153 Moreover, the Judge resolves ambiguities in the lan-
guage of a statute or treaty in favor of the tribes.154 Consistent 
with the theory of tribal self-determination, he is hesitant about 
interfering with tribal decision-making bodies.155 He prefers to 
let the tribes make their own decisions, recognizing that some of 
the decisions may not meet the standards he would apply to fed-
eral or state governmental institutions. 
Although the Judge's perspective is overwhelmingly sympa-
thetic to tribal interests, this is not to say that a tribal or indi-
vidual Indian litigant necessarily prevails before a panel with 
Judge McKay. As a careful participant in the judicial process, 
the Judge adheres to precedent, and he has authored some ma-
jor opinions adverse to tribal interests.156 
nomic grounds, communitization agreements that would have extended certain oil and 
gas leases on Indian lands beyond their original 10-year terms. Kenai Oil & Gas, Inc. v. 
Department of Interior, 671 F.2d 383 {lOth Cir. 1982); see also Glover Constr. Co. v. 
Andrus, 591 F.2d 554, 566 n.lO (lOth Cir. 1979) {McKay, J., dissenting) ("The policy of 
the Buy Indian Act is to encourage Indian economic development by shielding Indian 
economic enterprises from the full rigors of market pressure."), aff'd, 446 U.S. 608 
(1980); cf. Pueblo de San Felipe v. Hodel, 770 F.2d 915, 917 {lOth Cir. 1985) {Interior 
Secretary's "fiduciary duty" to tribes). 
152. The Judge also views tribes' immunity from suit broadly, and he scrutinizes 
any suit against a tribe's officials or an entity incorporated by a tribe to insure that the 
suit is not an attempt to circumvent sovereign immunity. For example, in his concurring 
opinion in Tenneco Oil Co. v. Sac & Fox Tribe, 725 F.2d 572, 576 (lOth Cir. 1984), the 
Judge noted that "every suit that seeks to enjoin an officer acting in his representative 
capacity raises the question of whether relief granted against the officer will not in effect 
grant relief against the sovereign," and he suggested that the trial court carefully con-
sider the immunity issue on remand. See also Ramey Constr. Co. v. Apache Tribe, 673 
F.2d 315, 318-21 (lOth Cir. 1982) (holding that sovereign immunity bars suit arising 
under construction contract against tribe even though tribe had not raised the issue 
before an earlier appeal; waiver of immunity must be express to be recognized). 
153. E.g., Mescalero Apache Tribe v. New Mexico, 630 F.2d 724, 731-32 (lOth Cir. 
1980), vacated, 450 U.S. 1036 {1981), decision on remand, 677 F.2d 55 {lOth Cir. 1982) 
{reinstating previous opinion), aff'd, 462 U.S. 324 (1983); Mescalero Apache Tribe v. 
O'Cheskey, 625 F.2d 967, 983-87 (lOth Cir. 1980) {dissenting opinion), cert. denied, 450 
u.s. 959 (1981). 
154. E.g., Oklahoma Gas & Elec. Co. v. United States, 609 F.2d 1365, 1367 (lOth Cir. 
1979). 
155. E.g., Wheeler v. Department of Interior, 811 F.2d 549, 553 (lOth Cir. 1987) 
{refusing to order Interior Department to intervene in tribal election; "when a tribal 
forum exists for resolving a tribal election dispute, the Department must respect the 
tribe's right to self-government"). 
156. E.g., Navajo Tribe v. New Mexico, 809 F.2d 1455 (lOth Cir. 1987) (tribe's claim 
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B. Limits on State Jurisdiction Within Im:J:ian Lands: 
Mescalero Apache Tribe v. New Mexico 
In the late 1970s and early 1980s the Tenth Circuit heard a 
number of cases arising from the Mescalero Apache Tribe's167 
successful attempts to develop tourism on its New Mexico reser-
vation. Among other things, the Tribe constructed a major re-
sort complex, the Inn of the Mountain Gods, and established its 
own hunting and fishing regulatory system. Both led to litiga-
tion. The state of New Mexico sought to impose its hunting and 
fishing laws within the reservation and also to tax the gross re-
ceipts of the non-Indian contractors constructing the Inn.m 
Mescalero Apache Tribe v. New Mexico159 is a significant 
case considering the extent to which states may impose their 
game laws within reservation boundaries, and, because of its 
scope, it is a particularly good case to illustrate the McKay anal-
ysis. The case endured a tortuous procedural history. The Tenth 
Circuit, in a lengthy opinion written by Judge McKay, originally 
ruled for the Tribe in 1980, affirming the district court's holding 
that New Mexico could not enforce its game laws against non-
Indians for acts done on the tribal reservation.160 The Supreme 
Court, however, vacated the decision and remanded Mescalero 
for reconsideration161 in light of another recent Supreme Court 
to unallotted lands within executive order reservation cognizable only under Indian 
Claims Compensation Act; action therefore dismissed); Iowa Tribe v. Kansas, 787 F.2d 
1434 (lOth Cir. 1986) (Kansas held to have jurisdiction under Kansas Act, 18 U.S.C. § 
3243 (1982), over sale of "pull-tab cards" in connection with bingo games on reservations 
within the state). 
157. The Mescaleros, one of the branches of the Apaches, were historically hunters 
and gatherers. Their name came "from the Apache custom of gathering and roasting the 
heads of mescal, or agave, plants." A. JosEPHY, supra note 34, at 170. The mescal plant 
should not be confused with peyote. See A. DEBO, A HISTORY OF THE INDIANS OF THE 
UNITED STATES 199 n.5 (1974). 
158. The state prevailed in the tax case, before the Tenth Circuit sitting en bane, 
but over a vigorous McKay dissent. Mescalero Apache Tribe v. O'Cheskey, 625 F.2d 967 
(lOth Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 959 (1981). A panel including Judge M;cKay also 
heard cases involving contract issues arising from the construction project. See Ramey 
Constr. Co. v. Apache Tribe, 673 F.2d 315 (lOth Cir. 1982); Ramey Constr. Co. v. Apache 
Tribe, 616 F.2d 464 (lOth Cir. 1980). 
159. 630 F.2d 724 (lOth Cir. 1980), vacated, 450 U.S. 1036 (1981), decision on re-
mand, 677 F.2d 55 (lOth Cir. 1982) (reinstating previous opinion), aff'd, 462 U.S. 324 
(1983). Mescalero was listed as one of Judge McKay's two most "Noteworthy Rulings" in 
Monroe G. McKay, supra note 2, and the facts of Mescalero are quoted from the McKay 
opinion for pedagogical purposes in M. PRICE & R CLINTON, supra note 25, at 342-43. 
160. 630 F.2d at 724. Judge Doyle joined in the opinion of the court, but the third 
member of the panel, Judge Breitenstein, merely concurred in the result. 
161. 450 u.s. 1036 (1981). 
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decision, United States v. Montana. 162 On remand, the Tenth · 
Circuit, in a brief McKay opinion, held to its original position/63 
which the Supreme Court affirmed in 1983.164 
An extensive tribal regulatory system was developed in 
1977. Some of the regulations clearly (and probably intention-
ally)166 conflicted with state laws; for example, the Tribe did not 
require a sportsman hunting on the reservation to obtain a state 
license.166 The state did not challenge the Tribe's authority to 
impose regulations to supplement the state's. Indeed, the state 
conceded that tribal conservation efforts were fully consistent 
with accepted management procedures. 167 The state simply 
claimed the right to enforce its laws against nonmembers of the 
162. 450 U.S. 544 (1981). Montana dealt with "the sources and scope of the power 
of [the Crow] Indian tribe to regulate hunting and fishing by non-Indians on lands 
within its reservation owned in fee simple by non-Indians." Id. at 547. 
163. 677 F.2d 55 (lOth Cir. 1982), aff'd, 462 U.S. 324 (1983). The Tenth Circuit 
distinguished Montana, see supra note 162, in that the Mescaleros owned and controlled 
nearly all of the land within their reservation (of the 460,000 acres, only about 185 were 
held in fee by non-Indians), while on the Crow reservation only 17% of the land was held 
in trust for the Tribe, and 28% was held in fee by non-Indians. 677 F.2d at 56-57 & n.l. 
164. 462 U.S. 324 (1983). The Supreme Court decision has generated commentary in 
a number of academic law reviews. See, e.g., Woodbury, New Mexico v. Mescalero 
Apache Tribe: When Can a State Concurrently Regulate Hunting and Fishi'ng by Non-
members on Reservation Land, 14 N.M.L. REv. 349 (1984); Case Note, 1984 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 
191; Note, Whose Wildlife Is It Anyway? Conflicts Between State and Tribal Regula-
tion of Non-Indian Hunting and Fishing After New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 
3 VA. J. NAT. REsOURCES L. 315 (1984); see also Reynolds, Indian Hunting and Fishing 
Rights: The Role of Tribal Sovereignty and Preemption, 62 N.C.L. REv. 743 (1984) (dis-
cussing Mescalero and other cases). Similar, although not identical, jurisdictional contro-
versies may arise in other countries. See, e.g., Ginn, Indian Hunting Rights: Dick v. R., 
Jack and Charlie v. R. and Simon v. R., 31 McGILL L. J. 527 (1986) (discussing three 
Supreme Court of Canada decisions involving provincial regulation of Indian hunting 
rights). 
165. The Tenth Circuit held that the intention to create a jurisdictional dispute 
was, if anything, "an element in the Tribe's favor." 630 F.2d at 726 n.3. 
166. 630 F.2d at 726. Other conflicts existed as well. For example, the Tribe permit-
ted elk and antelope hunters to purchase permits in consecutive years, while state law 
did not. Hunting seasons and bag limits also differed. "By obeying the more restrictive of 
the regulations, a non-member hunter on the reservation could conform his behavior to 
the dictates of both Tribe and State. His doing so, however, would render much of the 
tribal regulatory scheme a nullity." Id. 
167. Id. at 726-27. An interesting polemic decrying the effect tribal victories can 
have in cases with environmental overtones is C. WILLIAMS & W. NEUBRECH, INDIAN 
TREATIES: AMERICAN NIGHTMARE (1976); see Shabecoff, Killing of a Panther: Indian 
Treaty Rights us. Law on Wildlife, N.Y. Times, Apr. 15, 1987, at Al, col. 1. (U.S. De-
partment of Justice charges chairman of Seminole Indian tribe with killing panther in 
violation of Endangered Species Act; defense is that killing panthers is part of tribal 
religious and cultural tradition and is therefore protected by the Constitution and by 
treaty). 
• 
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Tribe on the reservation.168 The Tribe sued to en.ioin the state's 
enforcement efforts. 
A jurisdictional case of this sort requires treatment of a 
broad range of issues and provides the opportunity for an expan-
sive treatment of fundamental questions. Mescalero was particu-
larly significant because it involved an issue, hunting and fish-
ing, that many tribes consider to be a crucial link to their past. 
Judge McKay took full advantage of this opportunity. Following 
Supreme Court precedent, as much as is possible/69 the Judge's 
opinion in Mescalero 170 weaved together a number of overlap-
ping analytical perspectives. It considered the extent of federal 
preemption in the area (which required analysis of the Tribe's 
retained sovereignty as well as the applicable treaties, statutes, 
and regulations), and, as a potentially independent bar to state 
jurisdiction, it considered the extent to which state regulation 
would infringe upon tribal self-government. 
1. Tribal sovereignty and preemption 
The Tenth Circuit was required to "determine whether the 
applicable treaty and federal statutes, read against the 'back-
drop' of Indian sovereignty, preempt exercises of state power."171 
Sovereignty is an elusive concept, and it is. particularly difficult 
to apply in the case of Indian tribes, which were once fully sov-
ereign nations,172 but are today something less than that. 173 Nev-
168. On appeal, the state conceded its lack of jurisdiction over tribal members on 
the reservation. 630 F.2d at 726. 
169. Many of the cases have been so fact-dependent and the governing legal princi-
ples have been stated with such varying language, see, e.g., infra note 192 (importance of 
sovereignty), that a judge has great scope for creativity and great potential for reversal. 
170. 630 F.2d at 724. The analysis will focus on Judge McKay's first opinion in Mes-
calero. The second is quite short and reinstates the prior opinion. 
171. Jd. at 728 (citing McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 172 
(1973); Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148 (1973); Warren Trading Post 
Co. v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 380 U.S. 685, 690-91 (1965)). 
172. That is not to say, however, that sovereignty was a concept familiar to the 
tribes. "Any discussion of tribal sovereignty begins on a questionable basis because the 
concept of sovereignty is fundamentally of Western origin. Applying a concept of the 
supreme and absolute political power of a state to a stateless society ... appears to lead 
to a contradiction in terms." 4 NATIONAL AM. INDIAN CT. JuDGES' Ass'N, JusTICE AND THE 
AMERICAN INDIAN 27 (1974), reprinted in L. MEDCALF, LAW AND IDENTITY 62 n.1 (1978); 
see also Davies, Aspects of Aboriginal Rights in International Law, in ABORIGINAL PEo-
PLES AND THE LAW: INDIAN, METIS AND INUIT RIGHTS IN CANADA 16, 24-28 (1985) (discuss-
ing sovereignty as international law concept) . 
Inherent sovereignty has been recognized by the federal government throughout this 
century. For example, the Interior Department's Solicitor General, Nathan Margold, 
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ertheless, whatever the limits of a tribe's sovereignty in other 
areas, in reservation hunting and fishing its powers are undimin-
ished by the passage of time. In Judge McKay's words: 
The sovereign powers of the Tribe in wildlife management are 
so pervasive that sovereignty here moves from a mere backdrop 
into a leading role on the litigational stage. The historical rela-
tionship between Indian tribes, their lands, and the wild game 
thereon has of necessity been one of great interdependence. 
Access to and control of wildlife was "not much less necessary 
to the existence of the Indians than the atmosphere they 
breathed."174 
The Tribe's powers with respect to hunting and fishing de-
rived not only from the "traditional reliance on wild game for 
basic survival needs,"176 although that was important, but also 
mentor of Felix Cohen, see supra note 19, noted in 1934 that "those powers which are 
lawfully vested in an Indian tribe are not, in general, delegated powers granted by acts 
of Congress, but rather inherent powers of a limited sovereignty which has never been 
extinguished . ... What is not expressly limited remains within the domain of tribal 
sovereignty .... "Powers of Indian Tribes, 55 Interior Dec. 14, 19 (1934) (emphasis in 
original). In some respects, tribes therefore have a status higher than states, so that, for 
example, the provisions of the Constitution's Bill of Rights are inapplicable to them. See; 
e.g., Native Am. Church v. Navajo Tribal Council, 272 F.2d 131, 134-35 (lOth Cir. 1959) 
("They have a status· higher than· that of states .... No provision in the Constitution 
makes the First Amendment applicable to Indian nations."); V. DELORIA, JR. & C. LYTLE, 
THE NATIONS WITHIN: THE PAST AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY 1-15 
(1984); see also American Indian Religious Freedom Act, Pub. L. No. 95-341, 92 Stat. 
469 (1978) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (1982)) (directing federal agencies to preserve 
and protect Indian religious freedom). But see Barsh, The Illusion of Religious Freedom 
for Indigenous Americans, 65 OR. L. REV. 363 (1986). 
173. Tribal powers are subject to defeasance by the federal government, which can 
unilaterally abrogate treaties and remove statutory protection for the tribal systems. See 
United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978) (some aspects of sovereignty divested 
by tribes' incorporation within territory of United States and acceptance of country's 
protection); Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90,-284, 82 Stat. 73 (codified at 
25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-41 (1982)) (in order to provide tribal members with legal protections 
against acts of tribal officials, imposing various civil rights obligations, including some, 
but not all, of the provisions of the Bill of Rights, on tribes). 
In his dissenting opinion in Mescalero Apache Tribe v. O'Cheskey, 625 F.2d 967, 986 
n.13 (1980), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 959 (1981), Judge McKay explained the relationship 
between sovereignty and federal preemption: 
Certainly from a purely theoretical standpoint the two sources of tribal power 
do not easily coexist; an increase in federal power over the Tribe must result in 
a diminution of sovereignty as traditionally understood. However, in the com-
plex body of federal Indian law the two doctrines reinforce one another. Both 
doctrines have arisen as limitations on state jurisdiction. 
174. 630 F.2d at 728 (quoting United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381 (1905) 
which is quoting the trial court). 
175. 630 F.2d at 729 (citing 1942 CoHEN HANDBOOK, supra note 25, at 286). Appar-
ently responding to an argument of the state, the Tenth Circuit noted that it made no 
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from the Tribe's control over its own territory. As the Supreme 
Court had explained, "[T]here is a significant geographical com-
ponent to tribal sovereignty, a component which remains highly 
relevant to the pre-emption inquiry."176 The Tribe has an inter-
est as landowner in its reservation lands, and therefore has a 
landowner's power to exclude tribal nonmembers from hunting 
and fishing on the reservation. But that interest as owner, how-
ever substantial, is secondary to the authority of a sovereign 
over its lands.177 
In its discussion of inherent tribal powers attributable to 
territory, Mescalero includes one passage of sufficient rhetorical 
power that it has been quoted prominently on a number of occa-
sions in widely varying contexts. New Mexico had arrogantly ar-
gued that the Tribe had no traditional territory, and hence no 
powers associated with territory, because "the Mescaleros were 
being swept from their lands by a tide of white settlers."178 
Judge McKay responded for the court: 
difference to the Tribe's power that the Mescaleros may historically have relied on only 
some of the game species on the reservation for survival. "At the treaty's signing, the 
United States must certainly have understood that the Tribe could alter its use of wild-
life as conditions changed." 630 F.2d at 729; see C. WILKINSON, supra note 12, at 37-46; 
cf. Glover Constr. Co. v. Andrus, 591 F.2d 554, 564-65 (lOth Cir. 1979) (McKay, J., 
dissenting): 
[T]he majority may be suggesting that only those Indian activities conducted 
in 1910 are covered by the [Buy Indian] Act [and hence the award of a road 
contract could not be made preferentially to an Indian contractor] .... [T]he 
Act's very purpose is to encourage Indian economic enterprises that would suf-
fer in a competitive context. The view of the Apt expressed in today's opinion 
threatens to relegate it to a role of protecting. Indian handicraft and trinket 
production-economic activities that probably require no preferential treat-
ment at all. 
The Supreme Court affirmed the Tenth Circuit decision in Glover, but its resolution of 
the case did not require consideration of the Judge's passage of time argument. 446 U.S. 
608 (1980). 
176. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 151 (1980). 
177. 630 F.2d at 729 (citing, e.g., United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975) 
("Indian tribes are unique aggregations and possessing attributes of sovereignty over 
both their members and their territory")). In his concurrence in Merrion v. Jicarilla 
Apache Tribe, 617 F.2d 537 (lOth Cir. 1980), aff'd, 455 U.S. 130 (1982), the Judge argued 
that "the principle of self-determination may be said to require protection of territorial-
ity." Id. at 550 (emphasis in original) (citing McCoy, The Doctrine of Tribal Sover-
eignty: Accommodating Tribal, State, and Federal Interests, 13 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 
357, 390 & n.l54 (1978)); see also Mescalero Apache Tribe v. O'Cheskey, 625 F.2d 967, 
987 (lOth Cir. 1980) (McKay, J., dissenting) (to same effect), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 959 
(1981). 
178. 630 F.2d at 730 (citation omitted). The Mescalero reservation, established by 
executive order on May 29, 1873, is situated within the traditional Mescalero territory, 
but the Tribe was not always in residence there. For example, several hundred Mes-
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If we were to accept the State's argument, we would be en-
shrining the rather perverse notion that traditional rights are 
not to be protected in precisely those instances when protec-
tion is essential, i.e., when a dominant group has succeeded in 
temporarily frustrating exercise of those rights. We prefer a 
view more compatible with the theory of this nation's found-
ing: rights do not cease to exist because a government fails to 
secure them. See The Declaration of Independence (1776).179 
This language was used to close a Yale Law Journal article that 
had nothing to do with Indian law/80 and a recent distinguished 
study of the Supreme Court's Indian law record quoted the pas-
sage as the "ultimate philosophical basis" for a tribe's not losing 
traditional rights through failure or inability to exercise those 
rights. 181 
The Tribe thus had a sovereign's power to regulate hunting 
and fishing before the signing of any treaty, and the 1852 treaty 
with the Mescaleros,182 which did not speak of hunting and fish-
ing rights, was " 'not a grant of rights to the Indians, but a grant 
of rights from them-a reservation of those not granted.' mss 
Congress could have abrogated rights protected by treaty, but 
caleros were captured and located on the infamous Bosque Redondo in the early 1860s. 
They were badly treated, forbidden to leave the reservation or even to make mescal, see 
supra note 157, and in 1864 were joined by more than 8,000 Navajos, who had been 
rounded up and marched (the "Long Walk") to the Bosque. The two tribes were hostile, 
and in 1865 the Mescaleros escaped and vanished for several years, reappearing when the 
reservation was created within their own territory. A DEBO, supra note 157, at 198-99. 
179. 630 F.2d at 730. 
180. Johnson, Race and the Decision to Detain a Suspect, 93 YALE L.J. 214, 258 
(1983). 
181. C. WILKINSON, supra note 12, at 46. 
182. Treaty with the Apaches, July 1, 1852, 10 Stat. 979 (1852), reprinted in INDIAN 
AFFAIRS: LAWS AND TREATIES 598 (C. Kappler ed. 1904). If the Mescaleros had signed no 
treaty with the federal government, that fact would not necessarily have been fatal to 
their cause. In another case involving the power of the Jicarilla Apaches to impose a 
severance tax on minerals taken from reservation lands, the Judge, responding by special 
concurrence to an argument made by a dissenter, discussed the effect of Congress' failure 
to ratify a treaty: 
[Such a failure] does not convert a "nation" into a voluntary association. The 
profile of the tribe's rights, practices and relationships under federal authority 
properly reflects a status similar to the tribes whose proposed treaties were 
indeed ratified. "Executive order reservations have exactly the same validity 
and status as any other type of reservation." 
Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 617 F.2d 537, 550 (lOth Cir. 1980) (quoting 1942 Co-
HEN HANDBOOK, supra note 25, at 299), aff'd, 455 U.S. 130 (19S2); see also C. WILKINSON, 
supra note 12, at 7-9 (discussing status of reservations). 
183. 630 F.2d at 729 (quoting United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381 (1905) 
which is quoting the trial court). 
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such abrogation would have to be explicit to be honored, and 
Congress had taken no such explicit steps.184 ~ 
To hold that the Tribe had a sovereign's power to regulate 
hunting and fishing merely began the preemption analysis, how-
ever, because the existence of one sovereign's powers does not 
necessarily preclude the application of another's. Moreover, 
shortly before the Tenth Circuit opinion in Mescalero, the Su-
preme Court, in Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Col-
ville Indian Reservation, 1811 had rejected a tribal claim that the 
state of Washington could not tax reservation cigarette sales to 
tribal nonmembers. Tribes retain a sovereign's power to tax/86 
but dual systems of taxation are common: a state's imposition of 
its revenue-raising tax on cigarette sales was not necessarily in-
consistent with a tribal revenue-raising scheme.187 
The McKay opinion easily distinguished Colville by noting 
184. 630 F.2d at 729 (citing Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 404, 413 
(1968); United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978)); see generally Wilkinson & 
Volkman, Judicial Review of Indian Treaty Abrogation: "As Long As Water Flows, or 
Grass Grows Upon the Earth"-How Long a Time Is That?, 63 CALIF. L. REv. 601 
(1975). United States v. Dion, 106 S. Ct. 2216 (1986), is a recent example in which ex-
plicit abrogation was determined to have occurred. The Yankton Sioux Tribe had rights 
to hunt bald and golden eagles under a treaty, but the Court determined those rights 
had been abrogated by the Bald Eagle Protection Act, ch. 278, 54 Stat. 250 (1940) (codi-
fied at 16 U.S.C. §§ 668-668c (1982)), and the Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. 
No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-43 (1982 & Supp. II 
1984)). Among other things, the Acts included provision for hunting "for the religious 
purposes of Indian tribes" ifpermits were first secured from the Secretary of the Inte-
rior. Dion, 106 S. Ct. at 2221 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 668a (1982)). 
185. 447 u.s. 134 (1980). 
186 .. The power to tax is an element of sovereignty that Indian tribes retain unless 
expressly withdrawn by the federal government. See 1982 COHEN HANDBOOK, supra note 
8, at 431; Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 617 F.2d at 541. 
The taxing power is also important to a tribe's power to govern itself and thus may 
be protected under the "infringement" analysis as well. See infra notes 209-20 and ac-
companying text. Judge McKay noted in his Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe concur-
rence, see supra note 182, that "[i]t simply does not make sense to expect the tribes to 
carry out municipal functions approved and mandated by Congress without being able to 
exercise at least minimal taxing powers, whether they take the form of real estate taxes, 
leasehold taxes or severance taxes." 617 F.2d at 550. The Supreme Court, recognizing the 
power of the language as well as the cogency of the thoughts, quoted the McKay lan-
guage with approval in affirming Jicarilla. 455 U.S. at 138·n.5; see Fulwood, Of Tribes 
and Taxes: Limits on Indian Tribal Power to Tax Nonmembers, 1986 UTAH L. REV. 729, 
731-38; see also Williams, The Algebra of Federal Indian Law: The Hard Trail of 
Decolonizing and Americanizing the White Man's Indian Jurisprudence, 1986 Wrs. L. 
REV. 219, 279 ("Merrion should be read as but a part of the long litany of European 
derived legal texts which seek to hierarchically subordinate the Indian's self-defining vi-
sion within the universalized structures of the white man's legal and political 
worldview."). 
187. Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 617 F.2d at 541-42. 
1103] JUDGE MONROE G. McKAY 1147 
that hunting and fishing are special; they constitute a significant 
tribal interest.188 In contrast, cigarette sales implicate no distinct 
tribal interest.189 Moreover, although dual taxing schemes that 
are purely revenue-raising in character may coexist, Judge Mc-
Kay suggested that dual regulatory schemes are inherently con-
flicting. Thus, the Tenth Circuit held, in a key provision that 
extended the law, "[i]t is because of this characteristic of regula-
tion that we presume, when Indian tribes under federal protec-
tion seek to regulate their traditional interests, that federal law 
has preempted state jurisdiction"190-a "presumption of 
preemption."191 
Although the retained sovereignty of the Mescaleros ap-
pears to have been sufficient, under the McKay analysis, to find 
federal preemption of the state's power to regulate,192 the Judge 
discussed the pervasive treaty, statutory, and regulatory struc-
ture as well.193 Under a time-honored rule of interpretation, the 
188. 630 F .2d at 730. 
189. Id. 
190. Id. In the decision on remand, Judge McKay again stressed the interference 
that would result from dual regulation. 677 F.2d at 57. 
191. In affirming Mescalero, the Supreme Court did not explicitly approye the pre-
sumption language, but its analysis is consistent with that presumption. The Court noted 
the Tribe's lawful control over reservation resources and stated that "[i]t is important to 
emphasize that concurrent jurisdiction would effectively nullify the Tribe's authority to 
control hunting and fishing on the reservation." 462 U.S. at 338. See Reynolds, supra 
note 164, at 792 (arguing for adoption of Tenth Circuit's "presumption of preemption" 
generally with respect to hunting and fishing, and noting that Supreme Court's opinion 
in Mescalero "comes close to establishing such a presumption"). 
192. The importance of tribal sovereignty in Supreme Court preemption analysis 
varies bewilderingly from case to case. Sometimes it appears to be controlling. At other 
times the "backdrop" language is used. In others, the concept moves to the back seat. 
For example, in Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713, 720 (1983), the Court upheld the imposi-
tion of state liquor laws on a reservation and stated that "if we determine that the bal-
ance of state, federal, and tribal interests so requires, our pre-emption analysis may ac-
cord less weight to the 'backdrop' of tribal sovereignty." See also Ramah Navajo School 
Bd. v. Bureau of Revenue, 458 U.S. 832, 848 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting, joined by 
White and Stevens) ("apart from those rare instances in which the state attempts to 
interfere with the residual sovereignty of a tribe to govern its own members, the 'tradi-
tion of tribal sovereignty' merely provides a 'backdrop' against which the pre-emptive 
effect of federal statutes or treaties must be assessed"); Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian 
Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978) (discussed infra notes 225-27 and accompanying text); Roten-
berg, supra note 35, at 423 n.79 (discussing varying language of cases). In Three Affili-
ated Tribes v. Wold Eng'g, 106 S. Ct. 2305 (1986), the Court quoted the restrictive lan-
guage of Rice, yet referred to the "important backdrop" that sovereignty may provide. 
Id. at 2309-10 (emphasis added); see also New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 
U.S. at 334 ("crucial 'backdrop' "). 
193. As important as sovereignty is in this case, we need not consider whether 
the Tribe's sovereign powers alone are sufficient to preempt state jurisdiction. 
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treaties and statutes were construed liberally in. favor of the 
Tribe, almost as if the court were examining contracts of adhe-
sion.194 Several additional sources for preemption were found. It 
is impossible to tell from the McKay opinion which, if any, of 
these factors was essential to the analysis.195 Read together; 
however, the sources make the case for preemption over-
The Supreme Court has not ruled on that question but has noted, given the 
pervasiveness of federal treaties and statutes, that it is "something of a moot 
question." 
630 F.2d at 731 (quoting McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 172 
n.8 (1973)). But see Three Affiliated Tribes v. Wold Eng'g, 106 S. Ct. at 2310 (emphasis 
added) ("Yet considerations of tribal sovereignty, and the federal interests in promoting 
Indian self-governance and autonomy, if not of themselves sufficient to 'pre-empt' state 
regulation, nevertheless form an important backdrop."); New Mexico v. Mescalero 
Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. at 334 n.16 (suggesting "infringement" test, see infra notes 209-
20 and accompanying text, may be solely a sovereignty analysis). The Supreme Court 
had also noted, shortly before the Tenth Circuit's opinion in Mescalero, that the pre-
emption determination does not depend "on mechanical or absolute conceptions of state 
or tribal sovereignty, but has called for a particularized inquiry into the nature of the 
state, federal, and tribal interests at stake." White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 
448 U.S. 136, 145 (1980) (emphasis added). 
194. 630 F.2d at 728 (citing Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373 (1976); McClana-
han v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 174 (1973); Squire v. Capoeman, 351 
U.S. 1, 6-7 (1956); Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U.S. 363, 366-67 (1930); Worcester v. Georgia, 
31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 582 (1832) (McLean, J., concurring) ("The language used in treaties 
with the Indians should never be construed to their prejudice. . . . How the words of the 
treaty were understood by this unlettered people, rather than their critical meaning, 
should form the rule of construction.")). The Treaty with the Apaches, July 1, 1852, art. 
11, 10 Stat. 979, 980, itself mandated "liberal construction ... to the end 1that ... the 
government of the United States shall so legislate and act as to secure the permanent 
prosperity and happiness of said Indians." 
195. The status of preemption analysis after White Mountain Apache Tribe v. 
Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 (1980), is puzzling. Judge McKay quoted White Mountain for the 
proposition that " 'those standards of pre-emption that have emerged in other areas of 
the law' generally do not apply 'to federal enactments regulating Indian tribes.' " 630 
F.2d at 730 (quoting 448 U.S. at 143). Presumably because it would not have affected the 
outcome in Mescalero, however, the Judge did not specifically discuss White Mountain's 
assertion that "any applicable regulatory interest of the State must be given weight." 448 
U.S. at 144. A "particularized inquiry," see supra note 193, that includes the state's 
interest sounds suspiciously like balancing, and the Supreme Court's Mescalero opinion 
appears to confirm that suspicion: 
By resting pre-emption analysis principally on a consideration of the nature of 
the competing interests at stake, our cases have rejected a narrow focus on 
congressional intent to pre-empt state law as the sole touchstone. . . . State 
jurisdiction is pre-empted by the operation of federal law if it interferes or is 
incompatible with federal and tribal interests reflected in federal law, unless 
the state interests at stake are sufficient to justify the assertion of state 
authority. 
462 U.S. at 334 (citing White Mountain, 448 U.S. at 144-45). If the source of preemption 
is the Supremacy Clause, U.S. CoNST. art. VI, cl. 2, coupled with the federal treaty-mak-
ing power, U.S. CoNST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2, it seems wrong to suggest that a state interest 
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whelming. 
The 1852 treaty, while silent on hunting and fishing, sub-
mitted the Tribe "exclusively" to federal jurisdiction and gave to 
the United States the power, among other things, to "pass and 
execute . . . such laws as may be deemed conducive to the pros-
perity and happiness of [the Tribe].m96 Preserving the status 
created by treaty, the 1910 Enabling Act for New Mexico placed 
the state's Indian lands "under the absolute jurisdiction and 
control of the Congress of the United States."197 
The Tribe was organized under the· Indian Reorganization 
Act of 1934,198 and its constitution was adopted and approved by 
the United States Bureau of Indian Affairs pursuant to the Act. 
The Act provided that a tribal constitution reconfirms "all pow-
ers vested by ... existing law,mee and the constitution itself 
gave the Tribal Council power over "wildlife and natural re-
sources of the tribe. "200 The tribal game laws were adopted by 
the Council pursuant to its constitutional powers.201 
The federal government's participation in the wildlife pres-
ervation efforts on the reservation was itself a source of preemp-
tion.202 Much of the reservation wildlife had been created or pre-
should be able to overcome a clearly contrary federal statute. See Feldman, Preemption 
and the Dormant Commerce Clause: Implications for Federal Indian Law, 64 OR. L. 
REV. 667, 678-87, 695-99 (1986). 
196. Treaty with the Apaches, July 1, 1852, arts. 1 & 9, 10 Stat. 979, 980. 
197. Ch. 310, 36 Stat. 557, 559 (1910). The Supreme Court had stated, in Organized 
Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60, 68 (1962), that "'absolute' federal jurisdiction is 
not invariably exclusive jurisdiction," but the McKay opinion concludes that "[i]n the 
area of resource management, the treaty language in this case suggests that 'absolute' 
jurisdiction is indeed 'exclusive' jurisdiction." 630 F.2d at 731 (citing McClanahan v. Ari-
zona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 176 n.15 (1973) ("[Egan] did not purport to pro-
vide guidelines for the exercise of state authority in areas set aside by treaty for the 
exclusive use and control of Indians.")). The Tenth Circuit was aided in this conclusion 
by a decision of the New Mexico Supreme Court, Chino v. Chino, 90 N.M. 203, 205, 561 
P.2d 476, 478 (1977), which interpreted Egan and McClanahan in the same way. 
198. Ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-79 (1982)); see 
supra note 34. 
199. 25 U.S.C. § 476 (1982); see also 630 F.2d at 731 (citing White Mountain Apache 
Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. at 143 & n.10) ("The statute thus reconfirms all preexisting 
powers of the Tribe and itself becomes a source of preempting power."). 
200. MESCALERO APACHE TRIBE REVISED CONST. art. 11, § 1(c). 
201. 630 F.2d at 732 ("Tribal ordinances enacted to implement traditionally held, 
and congressionally approved, powers may themselves serve to preempt the State." (cit-
ing Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382, 390 (1976)). 
202. 630 F.2d at 732. The Tenth Circuit thus followed the lead of the Fourth Circuit 
in Eastern Band v. North Carolina Wildlife Resources Comm'n, 588 F.2d 75, 78 (4th Cir. 
1978) (A state that does not participate in stocking reservation waters "has no perceiv-
able interest in reservation fishing."), cert. dismissed, 446 U.S. 960 (1980). 
i I 
'I 
I 
'I 
1150 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [1987 
served through the efforts of the Tribe al!d the federal 
government, without any state involvement. 203 
Finally, New Mexico had been entitled under Public Law 
280,204 enacted in 1953 as part of the last short-lived termination 
policy,205 to assert civil and criminal jurisdiction over the reser-
vation, but New Mexico had not done so prior to the expiration 
of the grant in 1968.206 Even had the state asserted such jurisdic-
tion, it would not have extended to "hunting, trapping, or fish-
ing" rights protected by treaty or statute.207 The Judge's opinion 
accordingly concluded that "[i]f those states which accepted 
Public Law 280 jurisdiction may not hinder traditional hunting 
and fishing rights, New Mexico a fortiori may not do so."208 
2. Tribal self-government 
In considering exercises of state jurisdiction, the Supreme 
Court has not limited analysis to preemption; all tribal power 
does not flow from the federal government. For example, in the 
seminal case of Williams v. Lee,209 the Court, in upholding tribal 
court jurisdiction over non-Indians in a civil case, stated: "Es-
sentially, absent governing Acts of Congress, the question has 
always been whether the state action infringed on the right of 
reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by 
them."210 Whether infringement is really a test distinct from 
preemption-there is doubt on that issue211-it provides a "dif-
ferent analytical perspective[]"212 that may preclude state exer-
cises of jurisdiction. 
203. 630 F.2d at 726-27. The fact that the Tribe had in the past occasionally cooper-
ated with the state in conservation efforts, the Tenth Circuit held, did not reflect any 
diminution of the Tribe's sovereign powers. "Past cooperation ... reflects nothing more 
than a temporary waiver of the Tribe's preemptive rights .... " I d. at 730 n.12. 
204. Ch. 505, 67 Stat. 588, 590 (1953). 
205. See supra note 34. 
206. In 1968 Congress amended Public Law 280 to require tribal consent to future 
assumptions of state jurisdiction. Indian Civil Rights Act, Pub. L. No. 90-284, § 401, 82 
Stat. 73, 78 (1968) (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1321(a) (1982)). 
207. Ch. 505, § 2, 67 Stat. 588, 589 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1162(b) (1982)). 
208. 630 F.2d at 732. 
209. 358 U.S. 217 (1959); see C. WILKINSON, supra note 12, at 1-3. 
210. 358 U.S. at 220. 
211. The Supreme Court often states that the two tests are independent but related. 
See, e.g., New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 334 n.16 (1983) (citing 
White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 142 (1980)). But see infra note 
213. . 
212. 630 F.2d at 733 n.18. 
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The test (or "analytical perspective") requires weighing the 
state's interest against the interest of the federal government 
and the Tribe.218 In Colville, the cigarette tax case, the Supreme 
Court weighed such factors as the tribe's and the state's reve-
nue-raising interests (neither controlling by itself), whether the 
tribe generated the value from which the tax revenues were to 
be derived, and whether the taxpayer benefitted from tribal or 
state services.214 Once again, Judge McKay was able to distin-
guish Colville: "In [Mescalero], the scales tip decisively in the 
Tribe's favor."2111 
Since regulation, and not mere revenue-raising, was in-
volved in Mescalero, state interference would have impeded tri-
bal power. "To restrict the application of the tribal scheme to 
members only would be to complicate excessively the enforce-
ment process and to render the very idea of 'regulation' an ab-
surdity."216 Moreover, the Tribe, not the state, had generated 
nearly all of the "value" the Tribe sought to regulate. The 
state's interests, apart from :revenue-raising, were not affected 
by the tribal system. 217 Finally, although the effect on the 
Tribe's revenues would not have been sufficient by itself to in-
fringe upon tribal self-government, the Tenth Circuit believed it 
a factor to be considered.218 
The self-government analysis should always be informed, 
Judge McKay argued, by the congressional goal to make tribes 
self-sufficient: "to help develop and utilize Indian resources ... 
213. A court must seek "an accommodation between the interests of the Tribes and 
the Federal Government, on the one hand, and those of the State, on the other." Wash-
ington v. Confederated Tribes, 447 U.S. 134, 156 (1980). This test clearly requires case-
by-case analysis, and is one reason why the Court continues to be inundated with Indian 
cases. Of course, if preemption analysis also requires balancing of federal and tribal in-
terests versus state interests, as the Supreme Court suggested in White Mountain, see 
supra note 195, the two tests may not differ to any significant extent. See Feldman, 
supra note 195, at 677-78. 
214. Washington v. Confederated Tribes, 447 U.S. 134 (1980). 
215. 630 F.2d at 733. 
216. ld. 
217. ld. Mescalero contained a finding that imposition of the state's regulations 
would have interfered with tribal self-government. The lack of such a finding had con-
tributed to a contrary result in United States v. Sanford, 547 F.2d 1085 (9th Cir. 1976). 
Eastern Band v. North Carolina Wildlife Resources Comm'n, 588 F.2d 75, 78-79 (4th Cir. 
1978), cert. dismissed, 446 U.S. 960 (1980). 
218. 630 F.2d at 734. See Eastern Band, 588 F.2d at 78 (financial self-sufficiency is 
"one major goal of tribal self-government"). Judge McKay's analysis on these points was 
largely followed by the Supreme Court, but as part of a preemption analysis, 462 U.S. at 
341, thus casting further doubt on whether the preemption and infringement analyses 
are independent. 
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to a point where the Indians will fully exercise responsibility for 
the utilization and management of their own resources."219 Al-
though the federal government may have the power to limit tri-
bal self-government, "[t]he federally declared policy of self-de-
termination becomes a mockery if it is subject to defeasance by 
the State."220 
3. Other issues 
Although the preemption and self-government analyses 
were the heart of Mescalero, the McKay opinion also responded 
to other arguments of the state. For example, New Mexico sug-
gested that, regardless of the result under the traditional analy-
ses, the seriousness of ecological concerns might dictate a result 
in favor of the state: it should not have to respect reservation 
boundaries when a higher good, conservation, was implicated.221 
Claims of impending doom are always suspect, and the 
Judge artfully turned the state's argument on its head: "Just as 
wildlife does not respect reservation boundaries, it also does not 
respect the boundaries of states. The State surely does not mean 
to suggest that it ignores state boundaries in its enforcement ef-
forts. "222 Instead, the opinion suggested, a trusteeship duty is 
imposed on every sovereign to protect wildlife "for the common 
benefit of all of its people,"223 and the Tribe was fulfilling that 
duty.224 
219. 25 u.s.c. § 1451 (1982). 
220. 630 F.2d at 734. 
221. The state had argued that "its management efforts are directed to biological 
rather than political units." Id. (citation omitted). Judge McKay responded: 
The State's 'biological units' argument would seem logically to prefer federal 
regulation, because only that regulation can take account of the varying condi-
tions without the restraints of political boundaries. Hence, if ecological necessi-
ties were to require changes in constitutional arrangements-a position we cer-
tainly do not endorse-the changes would not necessarily be those suggested 
by the State. 
Id. at 734 (emphasis in original), quoted in M. PRICE & R. CLINTON, supra note 25, at 
671. 
222. 630 F.2d at 734 (emphasis in original), quoted in M. PRICE & CLINTON, supra 
note 25, at 671. 
223. 630 F.2d at 734 (quoting LaCoste v. Department of Conservation, 263 U.S. 545, 
549 (1924)). The Court in LaCoste declared that a "State in its sovereign capacity" has a 
duty to protect wildlife. Id. at 549. New Mexico asked the Tenth Circuit to infer from 
that duty that only the state could regulate wildlife within its boundaries. 
224. Had wildlife on the reservation in fact been endangered, something New Mex-
. ico could not claim, see supra text accompanying note 167, the case might have been a 
different one. See supra notes 167, 184 (Endangered Species Act). 
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Nor did the Tribe's lack of criminal jurisdiction over tribal 
nonmembers, a result of the Supreme Court's controversial Oli-
phant decision, 225 affect tribal regulatory powers. Although Oli-
phant eliminated a significant component of tribal sovereignty, 
criminal jurisdiction over nonmembers is a special case, and the 
Oliphant principles do not necessarily spill over into other ar-
eas.226 Civil powers will ordinarily be sufficient for enforcement 
of game laws, and Oliphant did not suggest any divestiture of 
such powers. To the contrary, in spite of Oliphant, the Supreme 
Court had consistently reaffirmed the sovereignty of Indian 
tribes. As Judge McKay's opinion put it, "New Mexico's inter-
pretation of Oliphant would lead to the untenable conclusion 
that the Supreme Court implicitly abolished most aspects of tri-
bal sovereignty, while at the same time asserting the continuing 
validity of that doctrine. "227 
Having rejected each of New Mexico's shotgun arguments, 
the Tenth Circuit ruled in favor of the Tribe: only the Tribe's 
game laws were enforceable on the reservation, and the state 
could take no enforcement action outside the reservation for acts 
done on tribal lands. The state continued its hunt for a 
favorable decision in a higher court, but it had already given the 
case its best shot. For the state, the game was over. 
IV. JUDGE McKAY AND THE THEORY OF SEPARATION 
If Indian relations are our national "morality play,"228 
Judge McKay has a major role, and he plays-to use a cowboy 
metaphor singularly inappropriate in this context-one of the 
guys in the white hats. His opinions reflect concern for the 
downtrodden, a desire to right past wrongs, and a wish to let the 
Indian make it on his own-with the nation's help, if necessary. 
225. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978). Oliphant held that 
"Indian tribes do not have inherent jurisdiction to try and to punish non-Indians," id. at 
212, and Congress had not affirmatively delegated such power to the tribes. Id. at 195. 
226'. "In a limited area, Oliphant found divestiture [of sovereign powers], but '[i]n 
most respects the Oliphant Court's rationale does not apply to noncriminal cases.' " 
Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 617 F.2d 537, 550 (lOth Cir. 1980) (McKay, J., concur-
ring) (quoting Collins, Implied Limitations on the Jurisdiction of Indian Tribes, 54 
WASH. L. REv. 479, 508 (1979)), af/'d, 455 U.S. 130 (1982). 
227. 630 F.2d at 735 (citing many Supreme Court cases, including Santa Clara 
Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 55-56 (1978)). The Judge also suggested that if in some 
peculiar case criminal jurisdiction is necessary for an enforcement scheme, a federal stat-
ute can fill the vacuum. 630 F.2d at 735 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1165 (1982)). 
228. See supra text accompanying note 17. 
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Working on this article gave the author the pleasure of 
reading and rereading many McKay opinions. The craft, the 
breadth and depth of learning from many disciplines, the well-
turned phrases-all are superb. The sense of history,229 for ex-
ample, in a McKay Indian law opinion by itself makes the effort 
worthwhile. 
Yet, something is missing. The Judge's Indian law opinions 
do not deal specifically with the issue of separation. The Tenth 
Circuit quite simply is not called upon to reconsider the validity 
of a long-standing doctrine. One can draw ,inferences from the 
opinions, but the reader cannot tell for sure how, if at all, the 
Judge would defend the prevailing separatist ideology. One 
thing is certain: the Judge would have fascinating things to say 
about an area of the law in which his interest is so strong. Since 
the judicial opinion-writing format is unlikely to provide the ap-
propriate opportunity for the Judge to discuss his views, perhaps 
he can be convinced to write a law review article on this subject. 
What about it, Judge? Was de Tocqueville wrong?230 
V. CoNCLUSION 
The life of a federal appellate judge is often frustrating. Al-
though it provides intellectual excitement, it has almost none of 
the drama and power of the courtroom. Even as a purely intel-
lectual exercise, judging has its limitations: a judge can use the 
opinion format to draft learned treatises, with guaranteed publi-
cation and wide circulation, but the scope of inquiry is confined 
by the facts of particular cases. While contact with colleagues 
can be an invaluable source of stimulation, the telephone is the 
primary mechanism of collegial discussion on a court like the 
Tenth Circuit, where the judges' chambers are spread across a 
wide geographical area. Isolated from colleagues, apparently re-
moved from the great political battles of the day, a judge can 
feel himself the equivalent of an "honorary pallbearer." 
For most judges, the frustration passes or quickly becomes 
bearable-and with good reason. The decisions often have enor-
mous effect on the parties, on future litigants, and on planners. 
229. "[Indian legal history] is ... the contemporary life blood out of which current 
Indian law problems are often resolved by the courts." Clinton, The Curse of Relevance: 
An Essay on the Relationship of Historical Research to Federal Indian Litigation, 28 
ARIZ. L. REV. 29, 31 (1986). 
230. See supra text accompanying note 23. 
1103] JUDGE MONROE G. McKAY 1155 
Moreover, with his words read, and read closely, by a large audi-
ence, the judge maintains the power of a teacher. Walter Berns 
has described the power of words and the law: 
Lincoln's greatness consisted as much in his words as in his 
deeds, and anyone who knows, with Lincoln, that, generally 
speaking, laws depend on opinion, or sentiment, and that opin-
ion is formed by words, knows the role of rhetoric in states-
manship. A seat on the bench, even the supreme bench, is not 
the equivalent of a presidential platform at Gettysburg when 
the president is Lincoln, but a great jurist's words do not fall 
on deaf ears; they are heard and studied by men outside the 
courtroom, by journalists and teachers, as well as by legislators, 
who themselves speak to the public and thereby sometimes 
teach it. 231 
Monroe G. McKay does not stand on the platform of Lincoln, or 
occupy a seat on the "supreme bench," but the Judge's words do 
not fall on deaf ears. That is cause for celebration, as this great 
and good man begins his second decade on the bench. 
231. Berns, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., in AMERICAN POUTICAL THOUGHT 167, 168 
(M. Frisch & R. Stevens eds. 1976). The discussion of Lincoln occurs in. an article on 
Justice Holmes, and Berns concludes that Holmes failed in his obligation as teacher and, 
therefore, as statesman and Justice. 
